With society seemingly sharing more information online every day, privacy and security is on the forefront of the minds of people today, especially with the recent increase in internet data leaks and breaches that have plagued social networking sites. Both Twitter and Facebook have experienced several major data breaches in the last 5 years with the largest being the April 2019 Facebook data breach where private data from 533 million users was leaked online in 2019 (BBC, 2021). The apparent fragility of social media privacy has seen internet users seeking more secure communication forums. Applications such as Telegram have taken off in popularity due to the various privacy and security-oriented features on offer. Unfortunately, the appeal of security and privacy extends past individual users harmlessly seeking more protection against unauthorised access to their private data. Terrorist organisations such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have adopted the use of Telegram because of this promise of security and have migrated and adapted their communities to the platform.

With over 500 million active monthly users as of January 2021 and over one billion downloads since its launch in 2013 (Molla, 2021), Telegram has infiltrated the social networking market as well as the lives of those concerned with online privacy and security. Telegram was created with the aim of providing a means for secure and private communication that was ‘surveillance-proof’ from governments. Founders Nikolai and Pavel Durov founded Telegram after the Russian government pressured Pavel Durov to release private data of users from Russian social networking site ‘VK’ which he founded prior to Telegram (Saribekyan & Margvelashvili, 2017). While the security and privacy inclined features benefit all users, they are also exploited by terror organisations like ISIS to disseminate propaganda and hate rhetoric, fund, and incite violence as well as share sensitive operational information and strategies securely via encryption and lax content moderation. It is argued that because of Telegram’s promise of client privacy through its secured communication, and the platform’s refusal to moderate private channels, groups and ‘secret chats’, the platform has become a home for right-wing extremist groups and terror organisations where they promote and celebrate violent terrorist acts, thereby strengthening these radicalised communities and their extremist ideologies.

Telegram’s privacy-oriented affordances have enticed many people who are concerned about the security of their online communications to switch to Telegram. Telegram’s ‘secret chat’ feature offer users encrypted one-on-one communication preventing unauthorised access to the content of the messages or calls by third parties and even Telegram itself. In addition to this, the application offers screenshot notifications and delete-after-view message functionality (Altakwa et al., 2017). Voice calls on the application also have the option of being encrypted. Telegram offers group chat functionality with a maximum user capacity of 200,000, compared to competitors WhatsApp which has a maximum of 256, and Signal 1,000 (Molla, 2021). The application also has public and private channels, predominantly utilised for one-to-many communications by admins with an unlimited amount of users being able to access them (Walther & McCoy, 2021). Public channels are searchable to anyone on the platform whereas private channels can only be accessed via a  URL invite (Clifford & Powell, 2019). Telegram offers users free unlimited cloud storage with the added security of the physical storage devices being decentralised and spread across many locations in the world, averting any possible move by a government to gain unauthorized access to private data (Clifford & Powell, 2019). 

Telegram’s platform affordances and security guarantees have lent itself to groups looking to share information and communicate with friends, family, and wider communities in a safe and secure manner, attracting people and groups with harmless intentions as well as those that intend to exploit the security offered by the application with the end goal of causing harm. (Clifford & Powell, 2019). For example, Telegram was utilised as a central tool in the mobilisation of rallies and anti-government protests such as the 2019 anti-extradition bill movement in Hong Kong. These protests attracted thousands of Hong Kong citizens to flood the streets of the city in opposition of the proposed law that would allow China to extradite alleged criminals to mainland China, potentially subjecting those extradited to China’s harsh judicial and justice systems. Telegram allowed this community of protestors to coordinate and exchange sensitive information and strategies with large amounts of protestors anonymously, without fear of consequence (Urman et al., 2021). Just as easily as Telegram’s privacy-focused affordances can be used for good, they can just as easily be used for harm. Telegram offers “content hosting, audience development, brand control, secure communication, community maintenance, financing and information collection” (Clifford & Powell, 2019, p. 7). These are attractive propositions to a terrorist organisation like ISIS. The group have effectively leveraged Telegram’s affordances as a central communication hub to communicate, collaborate and share propaganda and other sensitive information with its members. Pro-ISIS private channels are effectively echo-chambers of extremist ideas and rhetoric due to the absence of outsider opinion, strengthening the bond between members of the group. Krona (2020) affirmed this, stating that Islamic State’s use of Telegram’s platform affordances have strengthened the interconnectivity of the terrorist organisation, particularly between the leadership and newly recruited members through enriched communication and collaboration allowed by Telegram’s channels and ‘secret chats’.

Telegram’s guarantees of security, anonymity and non-disclosure are purely seen as beneficial for its users, although it makes the regulation of content that is deemed as unacceptable difficult for the platform. Badiei (2022) states that Telegram employs a rule of thumb moderation strategy where it operates without a clear set of moderation rules and criteria to warrant the removal of content, which leads to inconsistent and unsubstantiated rulings. According to Telegram’s terms of service, the application does not allow users to “send spam or scam users…promote violence on publicly viewable Telegram channels [or] post illegal pornographic content on publicly viewable Telegram channels” (Telegram, n.d.). After the Breitscheid Platz Christmas Market attack in Berlin, Telegram took action and removed several ISIS-related public channels on the application for ‘inciting violence’. Telegram assured users that this takedown was in line with their terms of service and was not abandoning its privacy and security-focused approach (Clifford & Powell, 2019). In response to this takedown action, Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated that he was aware terrorist organisations were using Telegram to spread violent terrorist rhetoric which ‘horrified’ him but stressed that the secure encryption of private messaging on the chat meant that even he could not access this chat data (Feldstein & Gordon, 2021). By only moderating publicly viewable material, the company has effectively created a dichotomy between the types of communication that is and is not regulated. This leaves invite-only channels, group chats and secret chats not being subject to moderation in the interest of user privacy (Clifford & Powell, 2019). Telegram’s counterterrorism response towards the restriction of ISIS related content on its platform differs significantly to Twitter where in the second half of 2015, 125,000 Twitter accounts were removed due to being linked to terrorist organisations (Yadron, 2016). Counterproductively, Twitter and Facebook’s harsh stance against terror-related content forced a mass migration from mainstream social media platforms to platforms with lax moderation and terms of service enforcement such as Telegram (Clifford & Powell, 2019). Telegram’s inconsistent approach to content moderation has allowed far-right extremist groups and terrorist organisations such as ISIS work around and exploit Telegram’s lax moderation and allows for the promotion and incitement of violence to continue, enabling the ISIS communities on the application to flourish and proliferate on private, unmoderated channels.

While the use of social media by terrorist groups is not new, Telegram differs from other platforms as it encourages online ISIS members to participate in the creation of propaganda thereby promoting ISIS related discussion between members. This shift to a participatory culture approach by the terrorist organisation strengthens the bonds of members of the group, therefore strengthening the sense of community (Krona, 2020). Although the group has utilised the social networking application’s affordances effectively, there are limitations to using Telegram. ISIS’s reach on Telegram is not as far-reaching as mainstream social networks as it does not possess the ability to achieve widespread dissemination of information due to the nature of Telegram channels. ISIS therefore did not abandon their presence on other platforms completely, rather using Telegram in conjunction with other social media sites. ISIS uses Twitter and Facebook to locate and recruit individuals who are susceptible to radicalisation or who are wanting to become involved in the organisation, then moving communication with these recruits to Telegram where the application’s affordances allow for the recruit to be immersed in secure, propaganda rich pro-ISIS channels (Krona, 2020). ISIS channels are said to be “a virtual community that provides followers with a meaning and purpose” (Bloom et al., 2019, p. 1244). In addition to this, Bloom et al. (2019) also claims the construction of chatrooms of Telegram are psychologically addicting which thereby assists in the strengthening of these terror communities and reinforces the sense of belonging for the individual.

It is well established that social media networks have encouraged and facilitated the strengthening and growth of communities through enabling interaction, collaboration and communication with people who share similar interests and values (Hampton & Wellman, 2018). This is achieved by facilitating these connections which would not occur if it weren’t for social media due to a variety of traditional barriers such as geographical distance (Hampton, 2015). This is true particularly for the radicalised terrorist community. Social media platforms, particularly Telegram have enabled the connection and communication of ISIS members and recruits across the world, further uniting this radicalised community. This is done through encrypted one-on-one messaging as well as private ISIS-run channels that share propaganda, constantly exposing the group’s ideology to its members. These private channels encourage the involvement of all users as content producers, enabling all content to be rapidly disseminated to a global network of extremists, which thereby encourages “community building in secure digital environments” (Krona, 2020, p. 1906). This connection and collaboration of people who would otherwise never meet or interact because of geographical barriers is exemplified in the lone-wolf terror attacks that were carried out across Europe that ISIS claimed responsibility for. Prior to ISIS migrating to Telegram, 19% of deaths caused by lone wolf attacks were attributed to Islamic fundamentalism, whereas exactly half of the assailants who carried out terror attacks between 2014 and 2016 had received direct communications from Syria and Iraq-based Islamic State members online (Shehabat et. al, 2017). One of these attacks was the Breitscheid Platz Christmas Market truck-ramming attack in Berlin in 2016 which killed 12 and injured 100 people. The perpetrator of that attacks was found to be communicating regularly with Syria-based Islamic State members through Telegram’s encrypted chat (Clifford & Powell, 2019).

Telegram’s affordances have enabled communities to connect and collaborate regardless of whether the intent of these communities is positive or harmful. The platform has enabled communities of protesters to coordinate and mobilise anti-government rallies like those seen in Hong Kong against the Chinese Government’s extradition bill and more recently has functioned as the primary news source for Ukrainian people looking to flee the Russian-Ukrainian war conflict (Allyn, 2022). Telegram has also hosted the operation of terrorist organisations like ISIS, which has utilised its platform to spread propaganda, recruit new members and share operational information. It is clear through the exploration of Telegram’s platform affordances and how they align with the requirements of the group, have enabled the strengthening and global expansion of its community. Telegram will continue to face scrutiny from the western world on its inaction on the continued presence of right-wing extremist communities such as neo-Nazi groups and terrorist organisations like ISIS but will also continue to face pressure from users to not stray from its privacy-oriented policy and strong non-compliance stance with repressive governments requesting the handover of data. It is striking a balance between upholding the pledged privacy of users and the right to free expression and speech, but also being able to stop extremists from utilising its platform incite violence will continue to plague the platform regardless of the position it adopts.