Abstract
In 2019, Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement demonstrated how digital platforms could be used to sustain distributed protest networks under authoritarian pressure. This paper explores how protesters used Telegram to facilitate anonymous, leaderless coordination and how WhatsGap allowed political engagement through everyday consumer practices, forming the Yellow Economic Circle. The paper uses the ideas of affective publics and connected action to show how these platforms extended citizen participation into digital and economic spheres in addition to physical protests. Furthermore, it explores how this opposition challenged China’s cyber sovereignty model by creating independent information and community networks despite increasing censorship. The paper provides insights into the changing relationship between social media and authoritarian governance by highlighting how Hongkongers have creatively taken advantage of technology to preserve democracy and the freedom of speech by combining theoretical concepts with real-world instances.
Introduction
In 2019, Hong Kong had one of the most significant political protest movements in its history, the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (anti-ELAB). This law was meant to help transfer criminals. However, it caused a lot of worry and is seen as a major threat to Hong Kong’s legal independence, as well as the process of taking away people’s rights to free speech and safety. In response to this issue, about two million individuals participated in a significant protest throughout the city. As the government has increased surveillance of physical protests, imposed police crackdowns, and set up tracking technologies, several participants have progressively abandoned traditional protests to embrace safer digital forms of protest.
In this movement that has moved from offline to online, Telegram and WhatsGap are now recognised as the two most significant digital platforms. Telegram, an instant messaging application that facilitates hidden communications, offers significant anonymity and is personalised for large groups and channels, rendering it an important tool for coordinating flash mob activities, spreading police location alerts, providing assistance to the damaged, issuing escape directions, and sharing other relevant details. In contrast with traditional social platforms like Facebook or WhatsGap, Telegram’s security and privacy more effectively fulfil the requirements of demonstrators in high-risk scenarios. On the other hand, the locally built WhatsGap supports the movement through an alternative approach. It is not primarily a communication app but a platform for political beliefs with everyday consumption. The application combines user voting and data gathering to identify ‘yellow’ businesses that support the democratic movement and ‘blue’ businesses that are considered pro-establishment. Consumers may depend on their purchasing choices on these labels, transforming consumerism into a form of non-violent resistance and, therefore, establishing the ‘yellow economic circle.’ It allows those who are unable to participate in public demonstrations to articulate their position and engage in protests within their regular routines.
This essay will explore how Telegram and WhatsGap contributed to the development of a decentralised digital protest network among Hong Kong protesters, highlighting the development of notions such as connective action and affective publics on these platforms. These tools have allowed citizens to participate in creative methods under authoritarian monitoring, which has not only helped the movement continue but also challenged China’s speech control and Internet independence.
Telegram: Building Decentralised and Anonymous Protest Networks
Telegram was one of the leading platforms of communication for the anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (anti-ELAB) protests held in Hong Kong in 2019. Telegram allowed people to stay anonymous and allowed users to create an organisation free from traditional management structures, resulting in people moving from a traditional platform like WhatsGap and Instagram to Telegram. The rise of government surveillance and law enforcement forced people to need techniques that provided anonymity while supporting mass interaction among protesters. Telegram gave organisers the preferred communication choices for real-time updates, protest logistics, and safety alerts through its huge group discussions, broadcast channels, and bot integration. Users of Telegram were able to hide their names and phone numbers while using the platform, which helped users to be safer in frequently threatening political environments.
Su, Chan, and Paik (2022) mention that Telegram created an environment suitable for “symbolic participation and spontaneous interaction,” enabling users to engage actively with political content and respond quickly to emerging developments. Protesters used Telegram to monitor police actions, adjust their marching routes, share first-aid locations, and swiftly organise public support. Users might join or exit public channels at any time while maintaining anonymity, which reduces the risk of governmental retribution. According to Urman et al. (2021), Telegram promoted the creation of grassroots networks without fixed leadership, promoting flexibility and collaborative efforts from the grassroots level(p. 18). The above structure represents the concept of connective action defined by Bennett and Segerberg (2013), wherein individualised engagement and digital transmission replace traditional leadership(p. 91). In this context, Hong Kong protesters could independently decide how and when to engage while still contributing to the collective movement. Numerous channels functioned as autonomous media platforms, spreading live updates, translating communications, and offering emotional support, thus developing a sense of solidarity and urgency among the movement.
In addition to logistical coordination, Telegram also encouraged the development of effective public relations. According to Papacharissi (2015), these publics develop when emotional expression converges with political intent in digital environments(p.92). Protesters frequently shared messages of encouragement, grief, or anger in Telegram groups, which strengthened solidarity and connections between people. Michael et al. (2022) noted that in authoritarian circumstances, platforms such as Telegram serve as symbolic arenas of resistance, where emotion, identification, and political action converge(p.5). In contrast to Facebook, which was more open to takedowns or tracking, Telegram functioned with a degree of independence from Chinese internet controls. Its anonymous environment and unmanaged structure transformed it into more than only a communication tool. It developed as a digital platform for political protest, allowing the development of flexible, emotionally engaged communities that challenged central control through grassroots organisation.
WhatsGap and Political Consumerism in Everyday Life
While Telegram enabled a wide range of protest activities, WhatsGap fulfilled an independent but equally significant role by integrating political engagement into everyday life. WhatsGap is a mobile application developed by local Hong Kong programmers during the 2019 anti-ELAB movement, enabling users to identify businesses that supported pro-democracy. The shops were labelled as “yellow,” while those considered to be supporting the government or police were labelled as “blue.” (Chan, 2020) This colour-coded visual inspired routine activities such as purchasing coffee or having lunch with new political significance. Protesters can decide to support “yellow” businesses as a means of opposing the government via economic loyalty. Examples from the real world demonstrated this movement’s significance. For example, the owner of the restaurant Dose in Hong Kong was given the “yellow” supporters for saving her business after senior citizens lined up to support and even paid excessively for meals (Prasso, 2020). Similarly, C+ Burger in Sai Ying Pun saw business recover after a pro-democracy protest brought supporters to buy through its entire stock in hours (Prasso, 2020).It brought supporters to buy through its entire stock in hours (Prasso, 2020).
Instead of requiring public confrontation, WhatsGap enabled more peaceful but powerful acts of resistance. Users claimed that their selection of yellow businesses was motivated not just by convenience but also by a desire to demonstrate harmony with people who supported the same stand in the movement. In an article published by ABC News, a customer explained their decision against visiting blue shops, expressing a desire for their financial contributions to support individuals matched with their political views. This form of consumer behaviour transformed shopping from a daily activity into a political choice. The creators of WhatsGap created a crowdsourced platform enabling users to vote on the political views of individual shops. This approach is an example of what Foley (2020) describes as a form of digital protest that takes place outside of other types of physical protests. It was the combined impact of these relatively few actions that spread throughout the city that resulted in a pattern of protest that the government tried to put down (Foley, 2020, p. 6). Despite considering that people were not actively participating in public demonstrations, individuals were still able to make political contributions through their purchasing behaviours as consumers. The “yellow economic circle” even extended beyond Hong Kong. In Australia, Hong Kong immigrants tried to recreate the yellow shopping network, even though they faced difficulties such as political pressure and dispersed populations. This highlighted how the political and psychological connections developed through economic activity were transferable across national boundaries, despite ongoing difficulties (Lin, 2020).
The application additionally promoted emotional connection and collective identity, which is linked with the concept of affective publics Papacharissi (2015). Users could express anger, encouragement, or pride in their engagement through evaluations, comments, and community conversations. These digital interactions strengthened the sense that supporting the Yellow Economic Circle was not just about money but also about belonging to a cause(p.92). For example, popular Hong Kong YouTubers Sunny and Creamy maintained on promoting only yellow businesses to their large audience, refusing advertising from pro-government businesses even after struggling financial losses. Their loyalty proved that effective publics can survive via extended emotional belief in addition to business dealings (Lee, 2022).
Moreover, Ojala, Ripatti, and Torniainen (2023) claim that networked publics frequently demonstrate opposition through symbols and daily practices rather than through formal political engagement(Ojala et al., 2023, p. 151). WhatsGap allowed that specific form of symbolic protest. It transformed the act of dining out or shopping into a significant expression of support for the campaign. By allowing people to express their political beliefs through daily choices, WhatsGap expanded the boundaries of civic engagement. It demonstrated that in a context of surveillance and oppression, the protest might be displayed in several ways, including financial actions that were obviously long-lasting and emotionally impactful. Although a core group of supporters continued to support them, many yellow businesses in Hong Kong became less transparent about their political stance after the National Security Law was adopted in 2020 in order to avoid legal concerns. This demonstrates how protests through economic means had to change to reflect shifting political environments (Lee, 2022).
Digital Resistance and the Challenge to Cyber Sovereignty
The adoption of Telegram and WhatsGap by Hong Kong protesters in 2019 shows how digital platforms strongly disagree with the principles of cyber sovereignty, which Chinese authorities stand by. Cyber sovereignty provides countries complete control over their internal internet networks as well as the data found within their boundaries. China has put cyber sovereignty into effect through its monitoring policies and censorship techniques, combined with the building of its Great Firewall system. Its ability to hide domestic material and block foreign websites allows the system to prevent conflict and limit information spread.
However, Telegram is not a part of China’s internet network. The end-to-end encryption and unlimited global access made it challenging for governments to keep track of. Protesters used the app’s safe communication and anonymity to organise flash mobs, inform other people about the presence of police, and share safety advice. Unlike state-operated messaging platforms such as WeChat and QQ, Telegram enabled communication that was free from filtering content or keyword limitations. According to Foley (2020), authoritarian states rely on the control of communication structures to manage protests, but when people shift to hidden and decentralised platforms, that control breaks down significantly. WhatsGap also presented a challenge to China’s digital authority, even though it was not a messaging platform. Allowing users to organise and support businesses according to their political opinions created a social network that functioned independently from the government. This network grew quickly, but as it gained attention, tech companies began responding to pressure. In 2019, Apple withdrew the HKmap.live application, which enabled users to track police activity amid the protests, from its App Store after receiving criticism from Chinese state media (Crawshaw & Albergotti, 2019). Similarly, Google removed a mobile game related to the protests from its Play Store after a request from Hong Kong police(Tripp Mickle & Kubota, 2019). The protest movement continued to use Telegram and other platforms, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and different ways to download, even with the difficulties Hong Kong protesters experienced. Virtual private networks (VPNs) allow users to get around governmental firewalls and access sensitive data. They were widely used in Hong Kong during the protests, showing how technical literacy among activists became a form of resistance in itself. These strategies highlight how citizens can respond creatively to digital suppression and reclaim autonomy online.
Papacharissi (2015) mentioned that a digital public sphere does not necessarily need a traditional organisational structure. These networks are frequently composed of people who have similar feelings, objectives, and creative ideas (page 92). Under the government’s increasing surveillance, information blockade, and police suppression, protesters had to build flexible online communities while frequently reorganising and rebuilding their resistance methods to maintain continuity and safety. WhatsGap and Telegram were essential to this process. Telegram allows protesters to autonomously organise and collaborate without leaders through anonymous, quick, and decentralised communication. WhatsGap is a locally developed application that allows users to express their political stance in their daily lives by choosing to support “yellow” or reject “blue” consumption habits, which further promotes the formation of the “yellow economic circle”. These digital platforms are not simply practical instruments but also physical representations of affective publics and connective actions. The platform allowed users to share their expressions and information. The collective identity and consciousness of resistance are further strengthened by these emotional interactions. This bottom-up connecting strategy is different from organisation-led organising and gives a new perspective on online protest in modern culture.
Most importantly, the use of Telegram and WhatsGap demonstrates that even in an environment of state authoritarianism and severe information repression, people may create their own space through technology and reject the government’s digital sovereignty. Hong Kong shows that decentralised networks, digital communities, and daily acts may promote civic involvement and political expression. Social movements worldwide may benefit from this “decentralised digital resistance” model.
Conclusion
In conclusion, during the 2019 anti-extradition movement, Hong Kongers used online platforms to organise protests, interact with the public, and build a network under control. Telegram allows individuals to organise autonomously without a leader through anonymous, quick communication. Meanwhile, the locally developed WhatsGap has transformed daily consumption into political expression, extending the conflict to every aspect of life so that even if the user is not on the front line, they can still express their viewpoint through their consumption. These platforms provide a new form of protest and political participation as well as a technical convenience. However, they face difficulties. WhatsGap was banned from Google for its sensitive information, while Telegram has been blocked and criticised. Hong Kongers trying to break information blockades in digital space show that power struggles took place. User access to these platforms via VPN and other methods illustrates that resistance will not end due to repression but will change shape. Despite the cessation of the movement, the communities and principles developed through these platforms continue in the daily lives of numerous individuals. This shows a movement and how individuals apply technology to defend free expression and challenge digital dictatorship. Internet protests can protect justice.
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