With media’s influence reaching unprecedented levels in today’s digital age, especially during political crises, right wing media has adopted strategies to spread disinformation that spreads fear, anger and tribalism amongst their audiences.

Targeted campaigns serve to distort the truth and undermine trust in democratic institutions, creating a polarized environment that stops critical discourse. Using sensationalism, emotional manipulation, selective framing, omission, conspiracy theories, algorithmic bias, echo chambers, alternative platforms and polarization right wing media adeptly sways public perception to transform everyday political process into an existential threat in the minds of its viewers. 

This essay will explore these mechanisms and break down how right wing media sways public perception during political crises by using social media to spread disinformation.

Right-wing Disinformation Tactics

Sensationalism & Emotional Manipulation

Right wing media uses sensationalism and emotional manipulation tactics in order to weaponize social media’s ability to quickly spread (dis)information to amplify fear, anger and tribalism. Political figures such as Donald Trump make excellent use of this strategy, as Barrón-López & Schmitz (2024) documented; he made baseless claims of ‘stolen elections’ which were framed in apocalyptic terms, causing fear among supporters and demonizing his opponents as threats to democracy itself. Narratives like these thrive in spaces that are not political, as the article The Right Dominates the Online Media Ecosystem (2025) describes, right-wing commentary and sentiment sneaks its way into sports and comedy in order to normalise outrage. Swenson & Goldin (2024) also traced how right-wing accounts (anonymous or not) use sites like X (twitter) to flood people with posts containing disinformation designed to evoke strong emotional responses, for example exaggerated stories of voter fraud, which is designed to trigger a visceral reaction that bypasses critical thinking of the reader. 

There are many aspects to this emotional engineering. Vasist et al. (2023) notes that when spreading disinformation there is usually inflammatory language (e.g. “deep state coup”) paired with exaggerated and non literal images (doctored images of empty ballot boxes or violent protest footage) to steer the reader’s cognitive bias toward threat detection. Littrell et al. (2023) found that even users who are aware of the nature and properties of this content share it deliberately because they understand the power it has to unify groups. Rinderknecht (2024) also notes that at the same time, micro-influencers deliberately cultivate parasocial relationships and frame themselves as authentic voices against a corrupt system, which amplifies this dynamic. Cinelli et al. (2020) explores how all of these aspects combine to create emotional contagion; social media algorithms will serve posts that elicit strong emotions, which then creates a feedback loop of anger. Wellman (2018) links this to a much broader erosion of civic trust, where panic about “vanishing freedoms” and “replacement” narratives create a siege mentality that replaces critical thinking and dialogue with reactionary defensiveness. 

Basically, this entire ecosystem of disinformation thrives on escalation, as emphasized by Wardle & Derakhshan (2017). Platforms tend to reward engagement, not accuracy and this incentivises right-wing media to create divisive, controversial and/or emotionally charged caricatures instead of talking about the nuance of complex issues, which in turn makes politics a spectacle of perpetual crisis. 

Selective Framing and Omission

Another part of the right wing disinformation technique is to employ selective framing and omission to help mould public perception during political crises, again using social media to spread distorted narratives. Benkler et al. (2018) demonstrated that the right-wing media ecosystem operates in a network that is mostly insular, deliberately and systematically excluding facts that don’t fit their narratives and amplifying hyper-partisan claims, for example portraying immigration as an “invasion” while failing to report on economic and cultural benefits. This also supports Swenson & Goldin’s (2024) findings on right-wing pseudonymous accounts spreading voter fraud disinformation, which they did by cherry picking anecdotes like isolated registration errors and framed them as systemic threats to the integrity of the voting system while ignoring any evidence on the contrary, of which there was a lot. Butler (2022) also documented alternative platforms like Gab framing vaccine debates as “government overreach”, which omits the consensus of the scientific community on safety, specifically to sow distrust. Another look at pairing disinformation with emotive language in Vasist et al (2023) to radicalize audiences shows phrases like “medical tyranny”, which removes context to maximise outrage. When looking at this all together you can see a pattern of right wing media curating reality to place emphasis on divisive fragments and ignore facts, removing the grey area on complex issues in order to get as much emotional engagement as possible. 

Conspiracy Theories

Right wing media also has been known to signal boost conspiracy theories to undermine trust in democratic institutions, as documented by Barrón-López & Schmitz (2024). Baseless claims about election fraud were systematically promoted across as much social media as possible to mobilize supporters and discredit unfavourable outcomes. Manufactured falsehoods such as these are designed to exploit existing fears and transform a routine political process into yet another existential threat which provides justification for anti-democratic actions. 

Social media and how it amplifies

Algorithmic Bias

Social media algorithms also systematically amplify the right wing disinformation campaigns through their built-in biases that actually favour sensational and emotionally charged content.  Rinderknecht (2024) and Swenson & Goldin (2024) both found that engagement-driven algorithms, which is most of them, tend to prioritise divisive or controversial political content because it generates way more clicks and shares, which inadvertently boosts the reach of right wing disinformation and narratives. This then creates a feedback loop where platforms like Facebook or X (Twitter) disproportionately serve hyper-partisan claims, which is noted by Wardle & Derakhshan (2017). This explains how recommendation algorithms accelerate the spread of misinformation through “halo effects” that validate a users existing bias. You can see the consequences of this especially easily in right wing media ecosystems in which Gogarty (2025) shows that algorithmic amplification assists political commentary and disinformation bleed into spaces that are supposed to be non-political like sports and comedy, which helps to normalise extremist views. 

There are technical studies that reveal how deeply these biases are embedded, Nikolov et al. (2021) found that social media algorithms show 300%-500% more misinformation than they would have encountered originally. Allcott & Gentzkow (2017) documented how these platforms and their systems boost ideologically agreeable content disproportionately, even if it was factually inaccurate. Hampton (2015) says that these algorithms and the filter they create allows for “information ghettos” where users aren’t really exposed to challenging perspectives, only shown things they’re likely to already agree or resonate with. Vasist et al. (2023) and Mosleh et al. (2024) highlight even further how platforms and their inconsistent content moderation (which is often lenient toward right wing accounts, citing “political neutrality”) more or less sanctions algorithmic amplification of disinformation. Looking at this big picture you can see how supposedly neutral algorithms and systems systematically advantage right wing media and their crisis narratives, which distorts public discourse on a large scale. 

Echo Chambers on alternative platforms

Following on from talking about social media platforms, some right wing media personalities find themselves turning to alternative social media platforms where they won’t be at all censored, which allows them to cultivate highly insular echo chambers. Wellman (2018) noted that these spaces create tight-knit communities, in which views that are at odds with the groups are quickly excluded and extreme narratives are reinforced. Butler (2022) observed that platforms like Gab and Truth Social have become havens for right wing users, and have created self-referential ecosystems that serve to validate conspiracies and other beliefs. This is aligned with the findings of Benkler et al. (2018) on the “propaganda feedback loop” in right wing media, where partisan outlets, influencers, and alternative platforms all reinforce polarized narratives. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) showed algorithmic personalization exacerbating ideological segregation, further showing how users aren’t often exposed to challenging views or perspectives. Littrell et al. (2023) also highlighted how these spaces effectively promote extremist content, allowing disinformation to spread unchecked due to lax or lack of moderation. This all adds up to an explanation for how alternative platforms deepen social divides by functioning as safe havens for right wing audiences to be shielded from factual counter arguments or critical thinking in general. 

How public perception impacts crises

Polarization

The right wing media’s continued efforts to spread disinformation during political crises has also had the effect of deepening polarization in society. Cinelli et al. (2020) show us how algorithmic amplification creates echo chambers, reinforcing extreme views and minimizing moderate discourse. Boczkowski et al. (2018) found that users are more and more trusting and engaging with partisan content shared within their social networks, widening that divide. Hampton (2015) also noted that social media fosters “in group” and “out group” dynamics which are antagonistic and can be fuelled by disinformation to paint political opponents as existential threats. Wellman (2018) says that digital spaces like these function as insular communities, which allows conspiracy theories to thrive. Vasist et al. (2023) also links this polarization to disinformation and hate speech, and shows that fabricated narratives like election fraud claims exploit general distrust in institutions, which then radicalises specific parts of the population. These dynamics together illustrate how right wing media weaponizes social media to replace civic debate with antagonistic tribalism and create polarization. 

Real-world violence

This polarization has led to tangible consequences, notably the incitement of violence. Littrell et al. (2023) found that individuals that share false information, notably conspiracy theories about civil unrest or elections, are also significantly more likely to endorse extremist groups and violence. This correlation shows a frightening link between social media and radicalization, as repeated exposure to such fabricated narratives primes audiences to justify aggression as defensive, and escalates threats to public safety and stability of democratic institutions. 

Democracy being undermined & eroded

All of this strategic spreading of disinformation works to actively undermine democratic institutions by eroding trust. Wardle & Derakhshan (2017) emphasized that disinformation exploits social media algorithms and cognitive bias specifically to polarize and weaken collective faith in both electoral processes and factual discourse. Swenson and Goldin (2024) also demonstrate this by showing disinformation campaigns directly corroding public confidence in democracy itself. Benkler et al. (2018) goes on to show how these practices damage institutional trust, and they cited cases where disinformation framed independent journalism or judicial oversight as partisan threats, which served to legitimize authoritarian solutions. This all serves to create a feedback loop of disinformation fuelling cynicism, which then makes audiences even more susceptible to manipulation and so on, gradually eroding democratic norms.

But both sides spread disinformation!

While people will argue that disinformation exists everywhere on the political spectrum it is important to note that empirical evidence shows that there is asymmetry in the prevalence, reach and coordination of right wing disinformation. Gogarty (2025) quantified this, showing that right leaning shows common audiences 3-5 times bigger than their left-aligned competition, and that their narratives make it into spaces that are supposed to be non-political like sports and comedy. Allcott & Gentzkow’s (2017) study aligns with this to show that pro-Republican fake news during the 2016 election in the U.S was circulated three times more than Democratic equivalents. This imbalance was attributed to structural factors by Benkler (2018), namely partisan outlets, influencers and platforms like Gab and Rumble working together to amplify disinformation, which is also documented by Butler (2022). The dynamics of the right wing audience also work to amplify this, Nikolov et al. (2021) demonstrating that right leaning audiences are more vulnerable to disinformation due to institutional distrust, which is exploited by right wing influencers who Rinderknecht (2024) says frame disinformation as “rebellion against elites”. Wardle & Derakhshan (2017) emphasized that the right wing’s systemic production of disinformation coupled with platforms profit driven amplification creates a unique threat to democratic discourse which transcends isolated “both sides” false equivalencies. 

The findings of this paper highlight the significant role right wing media plays in using disinformation to change public perception during political crises. 

Amplifying emotionally charged narratives polarizes audiences and undermines trust in democratic institutions, which then creates a divided environment perfect for manipulation. This then creates a culture where critical discourse is instead replaced with antagonistic tribalism, which is a significant threat to the democratic process. 

To address this, it’s critical to invest in civic and critical thinking education to equip people with the tools to engage with information critically and constructively. Media literacy is an important tool for audiences to tell information from disinformation and will create a more informed society as a whole. Additionally, implementing better fact checking on social media to help curb the spread of disinformation in the meantime, potentially even holding egregious spreaders of disinformation accountable. It is critical for the survival of democracy that something be done to restore trust in democratic institutions and prevent further erosion by disinformation and right wing media. 

References:

Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211

Barrón-LóPez, L., & Schmitz, A. (2024, June 20). How right-wing disinformation is fueling conspiracy theories about the 2024 election. PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-right-wing-disinformation-is-fueling-conspiracy-theories-about-the-2024-election

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