Introduction
Both yes and no supporters used social media to influence the 2023 Indigenous Voice to Parliament vote through networked publics, hashtag activism and clicktivism.
Throughout the Indigenous Voice to Parliament campaign, networked publics were created to engage the public. According to Ojala and Ripatti-Torniainen (2024), the concept of networked publics first appeared in academic literature in the late 2000s and had its roots in research on the internet and online interaction. In their research on how networked publics have been discussed in academia, Ojala and Ripatti-Torniainen concluded that ‘publics’ are defined as those who are active users of different media and ‘networked’ narrows the concept to media users who engage with digital networked media.
Based on this idea of networked publics, this paper will analyse and discuss how both yes and no networked publics used social media to advance their agenda and the agenda of their chosen side to influence the vote.
Hashtag activism and clicktivism
Freelon, Marwick and Kreiss (2020) describe hashtag activism as having three main characteristics:
- a declarative hashtag to serve as the movement’s unifying slogan
- widespread engagement by ordinary citizens who relate to the hashtag’s core message or want to declare their support
- attention and support from mainstream media, celebrities, businesses, and politicians.
Throughout the 2023 Indigenous Voice to Parliament campaign there were two main hashtags, #yes23 and #voicetoparliament. While these were created by the Yes campaign and Yes supporters used them to declare their support, the No campaign and its supporters also utilised them to declare their disagreement. These hashtags also gained attention from mainstream media, celebrities, businesses, and politicians.
In discussing clicktivism, Freelon, Marwick and Kreiss (2020) suggest it is symbolic in nature and includes actions such as sharing, liking, and posting or reposting activist content on social media. While they suggest this type of activism complements offline activism rather than substituting it, they note that it helps circulate incorrect information that undermines democratic deliberation. From analysis of social media use during the Indigenous Voice to Parliament campaign it is clear clicktivism helped circulate incorrect information.
How the Yes23 group used social media
Yes23 was the main lobby group for the yes case. During the campaign Yes23 used hashtags across X (formerly Twitter), Facebook and Instagram. On X Yes23 has 18,000 followers, on Facebook they have 78,000 and on Instagram they have 67,000. On review of the types of posts they exposed their followers to I found the majority included:
- reasons to vote yes
- high level descriptions of what the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would be and information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament was designed
- videos and images of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and other supporters who intended to vote yes
- misinformation about the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who support an Indigenous Voice to Parliament.
In the lead up to the referendum the narrative that 80 percent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders supported the Indigenous Voice to Parliament was spread by Yes23. However, I found this to be not quite correct. In early 2023, the Ipsos poll surveyed 300 self-identified Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Ipsos, 2023) and the YouGov poll surveyed 738 (RMIT ABC Fact Check, 2023), while 80 percent of those polled supported the Indigenous Voice to Parliament, it did not mean that 80 percent of all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders supported it. This piece of misinformation encouraged questioning of the truthfulness of the yes campaign and supported the no campaign in their suggestion that the yes side was lying.
In addition to questions around the 80 percent, there were questions around what the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would mean not just for Indigenous Australians but for Australia as a whole. Other than the above-mentioned types of posts and directing people to the official website or the Uluru Statement from the Heart, Yes23 did little to answer the questions. This left an opening for the No campaign slogan of “If you don’t know, vote no”.
Renwick, Palese and Sargeant (2020) note the widespread idea that high-quality information for voters is a key feature of the democratic strength of any referendum. They describe high-quality information as being accurate, balanced, accessible, and relevant. Throughout the Indigenous Voice to Parliament campaign, Yes23 did not meet these standards because the information they provided was:
- inaccurate – it lacked detail; however, this was an aspect that Yes23 was unable to address due legislation not being available
- unbalanced – it focused solely on why people should vote yes
- inaccessible – while there was high level information available, detailed information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would work did not exist.
While Yes23 did provide relevant information, it did not address the concerns of the public because detailed information wasn’t available due to lack of legislation.
How the Advance Australia group used social media
Advance Australia was the main lobby group for the no case. During the campaign Advance Australia also used hashtags across X, Facebook, and Instagram. On X Advance Australia has 8,871 followers, on Facebook they have 124,000 followers and on Instagram they have 18,700 followers. On review of the types of posts they exposed their followers to I found the majority included:
- reasons to vote no
- videos and images of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and other supporters who intended to vote no
- videos of Yes campaigners being asked questions they cannot answer or being negative towards people those voting no or undecided
- misinformation about what the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would do.
Similar to Yes23, Advance Australia also didn’t meet the standards outlined by Renwick, Palese and Sargeant (2020). The information they provided was:
- inaccurate and irrelevant – the detail provided was guesswork due legislation not being available
- unbalanced – it focused solely on why people should vote no
- inaccessible – detailed information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament did not exist.
Across Facebook digital astroturfing was also an issue. According to Al-Rawi and Rahman (2020) astroturfing is the practice of masking the sponsors of a political message or events to make it appear as though it originates from or is supported by grassroots participants. This can lead to consumers believing that the information they are consuming is coming from their peers.
While it is not clear if Advance Australia used digital astroturfing, Butler and Evershed found that across Facebook the No campaign drove a digital astroturfing campaign. This included one lobby group controlling multiple pages with contradictory messages and target demographics (Butler and Evershed, as cited in Graham, 2023, p.3).
How yes supporters engaged
In 2023, Associate Professor Timothy Graham analysed 246,000 tweets sent by 32,453 unique accounts and found that yes supporters made the majority of these. He found that yes supporters had five times greater tweet volume than no supporters and began their push early on.
Graham found that the main themes of yes supporters were:
- focusing on fact checking and criticising no supporter narratives
- providing detailed information outlining the arguments for the yes campaign
- countering misinformation from no supporters
- announcing support from nationally significant sporting organisations.
While yes supporters provided detailed information outlining the arguments for the yes campaign, they couldn’t provide answers to questions about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would work. Yes supporters behaved similarly on Facebook and Instagram.
On Facebook, I analysed 46 #yes23 posts. Of these 43 were from yes supporters with the majority being about supporting the yes vote rather than addressing the misinformation and racism from some of the no supporters.
On Instagram, I analysed 50 #yes23 posts, of these 39 were from yes supporters. Like Facebook the majority of these were about supporting the yes vote rather than addressing the misinformation and racism from some of the no supporters.
Another popular hashtag used by yes supporters across Facebook and Instagram was #voicetoparliament. It was difficult to assess the hashtag across Facebook because the list was overwhelmed with Instagram posts.
On Instagram, I analysed 50 #voicetoparliament posts, of these 22 were from yes supporters. As with #yes23, the majority of these were about supporting the yes vote rather than addressing the misinformation and racism from some of the no supporters.
Across both the Facebook and Instagram posts, the main commenters were no supporters. I will discuss the types of comments made in the next section.
How No supporters engaged
In Grahams research of the 246,000 tweets, he found that there was a greater number of suspicious accounts that related to the no vote. Many of these were newly created fake accounts that promoted the no vote and engaged in trolling, sharing discriminatory content, and spreading conspiracy theories. Graham found that while yes supporters made a concerted push early on, the ‘no’ tweets picked up in mid-May 2023 and showed a higher volume from then on.
The push from no supporters was also shown in the analysis I undertook of #yes23 and #voicetoparliament across Facebook and Instagram. While the majority of posts for #yes23 were made by yes supporters, no supporters were the most prolific posters in relation to #voicetoparliament. In my analysis of 50 #voicetoparliament posts, I found that the accounts that posted the most were gowokegobrokeaus and advanceaustralia with 25 posts between them. These posts reached an audience almost as large as that of Yes23, 161,035 compared to 163,000.
No supporters were also the most prolific when it came to commenting on posts related to the Indigenous Voice to Parliament. The majority of top-level comments on #yes23 and #voicetoparliament posts came from no supporters. While yes supporters used their posts and comments to support the yes vote, no supporters used their posts to push misinformation and racism in addition to the no vote.
In my analysis, I found a lot of posts and comments from no supporters that pushed misinformation about the effect the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would have on the rest of Australia such as land and homes being taken. The comments also included misinformation about current Indigenous funding, representation, and benefits such as free houses, cars, etc. that don’t exist.
I also found a lot of racism including posts and comments about Indigenous people wrecking houses, being alcoholics, not being able to look after themselves and other types of comments I don’t want to give any voice to, so won’t include.
Conclusion
In conclusion both yes and no lobby groups and supporters across social media used hashtag activism and clicktivism to advance their agenda and the agenda of their chosen side to influence the vote and networked publics were created around these.
During the lead up to the referendum there were two main lobby groups, Yes23 pushing the yes vote and Advance Australia pushing the no vote. The two groups had a similar number of followers across X (formerly Twitter), Facebook and Instagram and both engaged in the creation of networked publics and the use of hashtag activism.
Yes23 used hashtag activism to promote posts that included:
- high level descriptions of what the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would be
- high level information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament was designed
- reasons to vote yes
- videos and images of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who intend to vote yes
- videos and images of supporters showing they intend to vote yes
- misinformation about the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who support an Indigenous Voice to Parliament.
Advance Australia used hashtag activism to promote posts that included:
- reasons to vote no
- videos of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders who intend to vote no
- videos and images of supporters showing they intend to vote no
- videos of yes campaigners being asked questions they cannot answer
- videos of yes campaigners being negative towards people on the fence or voting no
- misinformation about what the Indigenous Voice to Parliament will do.
While their promoted posts differed, their use of social media was similar in that both groups provided information that was:
- inaccurate because it lacked detail due legislation not being available
- unbalanced because it focused solely on the vote they were promoting
- inaccessible because detailed information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would work did not exist.
Misinformation was also an issue with both sides, this seems to have stemmed from the nonexistence of detailed information about how the Indigenous Voice to Parliament would work. Digital astroturfing was also an issue from the no side, this led to consumers believing that the information they are consuming was coming from their peers when it was in fact coming from a lobby group.
While Yes23 and Advance Australia were similar in their creation of networked publics and hashtag activism the networked publics themselves acted differently. Throughout the campaign period both the yes and no networked publics had the opportunity to progress their argument however no supporters utilised social media to advance their agenda more than yes supporters did.
While yes supporters across X made a concerted push early on, the ‘no’ tweets picked up in mid-May 2023 and showed a higher volume from then on. No supporters were also the most prolific when it came to commenting on posts related to the Indigenous Voice to Parliament.
While the majority of posts for #yes23 across Facebook and Instagram were made by yes supporters, no supporters were the most prolific posters in relation to #voicetoparliament on Instagram. No supporters were also the most prolific when it came to commenting on posts related to the Indigenous Voice to Parliament. The majority of top-level comments on #yes23 and #voicetoparliament posts came from no supporters.
References
Al-Rawi, A., & Rahman, A. (2020). Manufacturing rage: The Russian Internet Research Agency’s political astroturfing on social media. First Monday, 25(9). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i9.10801
Freelon, D., Marwick, A., & Kreiss, D. (2020) False equivalencies: Online activism from left to right. Science,369(6508), 1197-1201. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2428
Graham, T. (2023). Understanding Misinformation and Media Manipulation on Twitter During the Voice to Parliament Referendum. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/qu2fb
Kovic, M., Rauchfleisch, A., Sele, M., & Caspar, C. (2018). Digital astroturfing in politics: Definition, typology, and countermeasures. Studies in Communication Sciences, 18(1), 69–85. https://doi.org/10.24434/j.scoms.2018.01.005
Ojala, M., & Ripatti-Torniainen, L. (2024). Where is the public of ‘networked publics’? A critical analysis of the theoretical limitations of online publics research. European Journal of Communication, 39(2), 145-160. https://doi.org/10.1177/02673231231210207
Renwick, A., Palese, M., & Sargeant, J. (2020). Information in Referendum Campaigns: How Can It Be Improved?, Representation, 56(4), 521-537. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1661872
RMIT ABC Fact Check (2023, August 2). Anthony Albanese says surveys show between 80 and 90 per cent of Indigenous Australians support the Voice. Is that correct? ABC. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-02/fact-check-indigenous-australians-support-for-the-voice/102673042
Ipsos. (2023). First Nations Voice Sentiment – Jan 2023 [Long Methodology Disclosure Statement]. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2023-01/Ipsos TAPC Methodology Disclosure Statement_First Nations Voice Sentiment.pdf
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