{"id":69,"date":"2019-04-26T17:00:35","date_gmt":"2019-04-26T09:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/?p=69"},"modified":"2019-05-09T12:11:50","modified_gmt":"2019-05-09T04:11:50","slug":"impacts-of-disinformation-and-fake-news-related-to-the-immigration-debate-disseminated-through-social-media-platforms-by-the-leave-side-in-the-2016-european-union-referendum-in-the","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/2019\/04\/26\/impacts-of-disinformation-and-fake-news-related-to-the-immigration-debate-disseminated-through-social-media-platforms-by-the-leave-side-in-the-2016-european-union-referendum-in-the\/","title":{"rendered":"Impacts of disinformation and \u2018fake news\u2019 related to the immigration debate, disseminated through social media platforms by the leave side in the 2016 European Union referendum in the United Kingdom."},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"Did
Image by Pete Linforth<\/a> from Pixabay<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The intentional and widespread distribution of\ndisinformation on social media networks is undermining democratic processes. Jurisdictions\naround the world are playing catch-up with this emerging and evolving form of\ntargeted mass communication. The 2016 United Kingdom (UK) Referendum on\nmembership of the European Union (EU) was no exception. The outcome of the\nadvisory referendum was very close – 52% for the Leave side and 48% for Remain.\n This paper aims to assess some of the\nfactors which led to a narrow victory for the Leave side and discuss if social\nmedia channels facilitated dark forces, foreign governments and their proxies\nto use these platforms to sew \u2018fake news\u2019; manipulating the electorate to vote\nleave and thus affecting the political and economic trajectory of the United\nKingdom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keywords:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brexit, United Kingdom, European Union, Fake News, Immigration, Clickbait, Trolls, Bots, Leave EU, Referendum, Voter Manipulation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Click here<\/a> to download PDF version.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The term \u2018fake news\u2019 has been widely used in political\ndiscourse since the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States\nin 2016. It is highly contentious, politically loaded and has been used to\ndiscredit journalists and news organisations who express often valid,\nwell-researched opinions (McGonagle, 2017, p.\n203). Disinformation about topics such as immigration, shared widely through\nonline communities on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were widespread in\nthe lead up and during the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership which has led to\nthe process widely known as Brexit. There is a compelling body of evidence that\n\u2018fake news\u2019 distributed on social media targeted voters in an attempt to\nmanipulate citizens to vote in a certain way. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An infographic titled \u201cBeyond \u2018Fake news\u2019 \u2013 10 types\nof misleading news\u201d has been created by the European Association for Viewers\nInterests (EAVI). The infographic is multifaceted and identifies ten categories\nof misleading news. It analyses motivations behind each category and likely\nimpacts on viewers and listeners. In addition, motivations are listed as money,\npolitics\/power, humour\/fun, passion and the aim to (mis)inform. Impacts are\nmeasured from neutral, low, medium and high (McGonagle, 2017, p.\n204). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the EAVI the 10 types of misleading news\nare:
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. Propaganda\n<\/li>
  2. Clickbait<\/li>
  3. Sponsored\ncontent <\/li>
  4. Satire\nand hoax <\/li>
  5. Error<\/li>
  6. Partisan\ncontent <\/li>
  7. Conspiracy\ntheory <\/li>
  8. Pseudoscience<\/li>
  9. Misinformation\n<\/li>
  10. Bogus content<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    The EAVI provides a useful paradigm to assess the 2016\nUK Referendum on European Union membership (“Beyond Fake News\n– 10 types of misleading news,” 2017). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Damien Collins is a British Conservative Member of\nParliament (MP). He also chairs the cross-party Digital, Culture, Media and\nSport Committee. On the 18th<\/sup> February 2019 the committee published a\n108-page report titled \u201cDisinformation and Fake News\u201d. Collins was forthright\nin his appraisal of the current threat to democracy in the UK: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u201cDemocracy is at risk from malicious and relentless targeting of citizens with disinformation and personalised \u2018dark adverts\u2019 from unidentifiable sources, delivered through the major social media platforms we use every day. Much of this is directed from agencies working in foreign countries, including Russia\u201d <\/em>(Collins, 2019 pp. 5).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The report concluded that democracy in Britain is\n\u2018under attack\u2019 by perpetrators using social media networks to try and influence\nvoters. Companies such as Facebook and Twitter are either unable or unwilling\nto prevent their platforms being used by third parties, foreign agents (or\ntheir proxies) to influence voters. \nDisinformation or \u2018fake news\u2019 is not a new phenomenon, especially when\nit comes to the immigration debate, but the way it is being used on social\nmedia networks is a growing concern. In 2010, the year which coincided with a\nConservative led coalition government there was a sharp increase in the volume\nof immigration related articles in the press and discourse about the ability to\ncontrol it (given Britain\u2019s treaty obligations as a member of the European\nUnion). The contentious issue of immigration has been something that has been\nfostered by certain elements of the press and newspaper owners in the UK for\nmany years.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The official Vote Leave campaign and unofficial\ncampaign led by Leave.EU used a full range of traditional and online marketing\nto communicate with the electorate before and during the referendum campaign.\nOne of the more infamous advertising stunts was the \u201cWe send the EU \u00a3350m a week, lets fund our NHS instead\u201d<\/em> emblazoned\non the side of a big red bus. This advertisement was quickly fact checked and\nreported as inaccurate. The \u201c\u00a3350m\u201d figure used was deemed misleading by the UK\nStatistics Authority (Dilnot, 2016 pp. 1). This scrutiny and fact checking of partisan\npolitical campaigns is welcomed and necessary part of the democratic process.\nHowever, the targeted and clandestine adverts on social media platforms, paid\nfor by organisations such as Leave.EU, were seen by hundreds of thousands of\npeople and yet because this activity was online and focused within selected online\ncommunities it was out of site of the main stream public gaze and was left\nunscrutinised. In addition, social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter\namplify posts and opinions which using the EAVI infographic could be seen to be\n\u201cpartisan\u201d, \u201cmisinformed\u201d and \u201cbogus\u201d (“Beyond Fake News\n– 10 types of misleading news,” 2017). This is especially the case around the topic of\nimmigration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The highly divisive topic of immigration was one of\nthe central campaign elements for the Leave side. This was exasperated by\nemotive headlines and the manner in which the immigration debate was being\nframed by media outlets such as the Daily\nMail<\/em>, Daily Express<\/em> and the Sun<\/em>. \u201cThe language used to describe\nEU migration tended to emphasise quantity and scale using words such as mass,\nvast, large scale\u201d (Penncheva, 2019 pp. 7).  Further\nresearch about this topic is examined in a report by the University of Oxford\u2019s\nMigration Observatory that highlights the increase in media stories related to\nEU migration from 2012 onwards and shows the media\u2019s increased obsession with\nthe scale and volume of EU migrants (Allen, 2016, p. 19).   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The poisonous aspect of the immigration debate led to one of the most defining political events in the lead up to the referendum. Just one week out from the UK\u2019s vote on EU Membership, Labour MP, Jo Cox was assassinated by a far-right extremist. Cox was an advocate for the remain campaign. The murder immediately shone a spotlight on the tactics of the leave side (“Jo Cox MP,” 2016 pp. 3, 7, 11).  Her murder coincided with the launch of one of the most controversial images of campaign. Earlier that morning a leading campaigner backed by Leave.EU, Nigel Farage was photographed standing in front of a billboard. It showed a long line of impoverished refugees \u2013 with a red headline using deliberate tabloid media speak \u201cBreaking Point\u201d.<\/em> The subheading read \u201cThe EU has failed us all \u2013 We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders<\/em>\u201d (Farage, 2016). The highly partisan message of the billboard evoked the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis \u2013 still fresh in the minds of many voters. This poster targeted concerns about mass immigration which the leave side implied Britain was unable to control as an EU member. The fact that Britain was able to control migration and its borders \u2013 it has an opt-out of the Schengen Treaty which covers open borders between 26 European countries \u2013 was never discussed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In the immediate aftermath of the death of Jo Cox and\nas a mark of respect, both sides in the referendum campaign suspended activities.\nEvidence has now emerged that this was not the case. Leave.EU \u2013 which was\nfinancially backed by millionaire businessman Arron Banks continued online\ncampaigning through targeted Facebook advertisements or as the EAVI defines it\n\u201csponsored content\u201d. Indeed, on hearing the news to suspend campaigning, Banks\nis reported to have told staff to continue and to \u201cpush harder\u201d, believing that\nhis ads would gain more traction given competitor ads were no longer active (Caesar, 2019 pp. 51). Banks knew his online ads were being seen and\ninfluencing a clearly defined target audience. The decline in other referendum\nthemed ads (during the campaign suspension) would give Leave.EU the opportunity\nto reach more voters and influence their decision and thus affect the outcome\nof this tightly contested referendum.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    According to Molz, \u201cIndividuals are empowered in the dissemination of information and the evolution of connectivity through social networking tools like Twitter\u2019s RT (the ability to \u2018re-tweet\u2019 a posting) and Facebook\u2019s \u2018likes\u2019 and comments. These mechanisms have a social effect\u201d (Molz, 2013 pp. 37).  Content created online can be sponsored and funded by organisations or groups who have an interest in advancing their own political objectives and ideologies. These groups target individuals whose data has been harvested with messages and clickbait which are eye catching and drive revenue for social media companies. Social media platforms are not sustained by factual content, but rather ads and posts \u201c\u2026whose algorithms prefer virality to veracity, where lies are spread faster than facts\u201d (Freeland, 2019 pp. 21). This meant misleading posts around emotional topics such as immigration were far more likely to spread within loosely connected online communities than arguments related to for example the European Common Agricultural Policy.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The UK Digital, Cultural, Media and Sport Committee\nhas published the ads placed by some of the leave campaigns, including those\norganised by Banks. 45% of Vote Leave Facebook ads were about immigration. One\nof the ads published showed a map of Europe with a big red arrow pointing from\nTurkey to Britain. The ad headline was \u201cclickbait\u201d and read \u201cTurkey has a Population of 76 million\u201d <\/em>with\na subheading \u201cTurkey is joining the EU,\nGood idea???\u201d<\/em>  It suggested that\nBritain would have no choice on Turkish membership of the EU. The likelihood of\nTurkey joining the EU is remote. And as an EU member state \u2013 Britain (as well\nas the other 27 members) would have the right to veto. (Gibbon, 2018 pp. 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Bank\u2019s aim was to cut through the technocratic subject\nof EU membership. In contrast the remain side focused on benefits of EU\nmembership such as the single market, trade policy, integrated food and medical\nsupply chains \u2013 topics which some voters felt had no relevance to them. The\nLeave side focused on communities who felt ignored and used arguments related\nto immigration and \u201cbeing swamped\u201d. Accuracy of the information was unimportant\nto Leave.EU – it was about emotion. The UK electoral commission has requested\nthe National Crime Agency investigate Banks. They were concerned that funding\nhe used as part of the Leave.EU campaign was channelled through him from\noverseas interests. Under British law it is illegal to use money in electoral\ncampaigns from non-British citizens.  \u201cA number of criminal offences may have been committed,\u201d\nthe commission declared. (Caesar,\n2019 pp. 8). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The critical difference between traditional offline\nadvertising methods and social media is the precise microtargeting of ads which\nleads to the amplification of \u2018news\u2019 stories within online communities. Stories\nwhich have no basis in fact are shared and become viral. By the time they can\nbe fact checked or debunked, it is too late. It is perhaps no surprise that in\nthe year of the UK Brexit referendum, Oxford Dictionaries announced\n\u201cpost-truth\u201d as the word of the year for 2016. It is defined as \u201crelating to or\ndenoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping\npublic opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief\u201d  (Freeland, 2019 pp. 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Facebook was not the only platform which played a role in the dissemination of inaccurate news and targeted advertising. The role of other social media platforms such as Twitter has also been under the spotlight. The use of the hashtag in the Brexit referendum debate, especially on Twitter allowed for the spread of information to occur rapidly between loosely connected communities (Huberman, Romero, & Wu, 2009 pp. 1) \u201c…computer programmer Chris Messina propagated the use of the hashtag (#) to label intrinsic topics\u201d. (Gruzd, Wellman, & Takhteyev, 2011, p. 1301). Hashtags such as #EURef and #Leave created connected community networks which disseminated news to other users. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The right leaning British broadsheet Daily Telegraph<\/em> reported \u201cRussia\nmobilised an army of trolls\u201d. This included 3,800 accounts which tweeted out\n1,102 posts using the hashtag #ReasonstoLeaveEU. The article goes on to say\nthat \u201c\u2026data from Twitter showed Russian and Iranian internet trolls sent more\nthan 10 million tweets in an attempt to spread disinformation and discord\u2026\nincluding a day-long blitz in the day of the Brexit vote.\u201d (Field & Wright,\n2018 pp. 2). While there were also pro-remain tweets, pro-leave activity was more\nvisible and more likely to influence online conversation. Their stories were\noften more emotional and controversial. The pro-leave community on twitter was\ndominated by a handful of non-authoritative news sources and a significant\nnumber of non-UK accounts (Sattler, 2019 pp. 37). Whilst twitter does not have the same mass appeal as\nFacebook, it is an important means to connect online communities. These troll\nfactories were creating content for other users to share within their own\nnetworks and across other social platforms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Today, very few countries have managed to effectively\nlegislate social media platforms to take responsibility for their output.\nIndeed, it has caused a debate between advocates of freedom of speech and those\nwho seek more government oversight. Many nations look to actions taken by\nGermany. It has introduced legislation to prevent the spread of hate speech and\n\u2018fake news\u2019. This is perhaps because of its painful past which has meant that\nopinions like holocaust denial can result in imprisonment. The Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz<\/em> or Network\nEnforcement Act (also known as NetzDG) law came into force in January 2018. As\na result, large social media platforms with more than two million users have 24\nhours to act and remove content once notified. Failure to remove \u201cobviously\nillegal\u201d content (including hate speech and \u2018fake news\u2019) could mean fines of up\nto \u20ac20 million. According to a British government report, one in six of all\nFacebook content moderators are now based in Germany. The report goes on to say\nthat this is \u201c\u2026practical evidence that legislation can work\u201d (Collins, 2019, p. 13)  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The debate surrounding social media platforms being\nresponsible for content on their sites is arguably one of the most important\nissues we face. Aguiton and Cardon suggested that Web 2.0 services as being \u201c\u2026a\nsmall step towards the democratisation of the use of weak ties, traditionally\nlimited to the ruling class and the elites\u201d (Aguiton & Cardon,\n2007, p. 62). It speaks of almost a liberation and freedom to create and publish\ncontent which is now, thanks to technology, available to almost anyone. While\nthis democratisation has brought many benefits to society, there are also risks\nand social media platforms have been reluctant to self-regulate. In March 2019,\nthe Guardian<\/em> published a story titled\nUkip 2.0: young, angry, digital and\nextreme. <\/em>The article highlight that UKIP (United Kingdom Independence\nParty) backed Unity News Network and their activity in distribution of\nclickbait and conspiracy theory to support the party\u2019s hard line agenda, all\nfrom a small flat on the outskirts of Glasgow (Halliday & Walker,\n2019 pp. 1). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The micro targeting of social media audiences\ntraditionally used by advertisers to compel consumers to purchase goods and\nservices \u2013 is now being used to deliver disinformation, in its many forms\nincluding extreme ideologies. Social media technology \u201chas made it easy for a\nwide range of actors to create content, including \u2018fake news\u2019, in a variety of\nformats\u2026\u201d (McGonagle, 2017, p.\n206).  In the United States the Wall Street Journal<\/em> reported that\nRussian troll factories used social media networks to influence American voters\nin the 2016 Presidential Election (Volz, 2018 pp. 1). In Australia, a recent Sydney Morning Herald<\/em> article voiced concerns that the 2019 Federal\nelection could see Facebook\u2019s advertising tools being used to target\nAustralians interested in \u201copposition to immigration\u201d and \u201cnationalism\u201d (McDuling & Duke,\n2019 pp. 2). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Conclusion<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In conclusion, the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign is\njust one instance of social media networks being used effectively to peddle\ndisinformation and fake news to influence political outcomes. The argument of\nnational sovereignty and \u2018taking back control\u2019 was a mantra for the Leave\ncampaign. Ironically, what is becoming evident from the referendum campaign and\nthe subsequent aftermath of the vote is about how democratic \u2018control\u2019 has been\nceded to those who have the means to infiltrate our lives; through highly targeted\ncontent on social media platforms we use on a daily basis. These platforms\nwhich were founded on the basis of bringing people together are now having far\nreaching, unintended consequences. Without legislation similar to what has been\nenacted in Germany, it is unlikely social media networks will self-regulate to\nprevent the mass manipulation of populations. If robust legislation is not\nforthcoming democracy as we know it will end.
    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    References<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Aguiton, C., & Cardon, D. (2007). The Strength of Weak Cooperation: An\nAttempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0. Communications & Strategies, 65<\/em>, 51-65. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Allen, W. L. (2016). A decade of Immigration in the British Press<\/em>. Retrieved: https:\/\/migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/11\/Report-Decade_Immigration_British_Press-1.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Beyond Fake News – 10 types of misleading\nnews. (2017).   Retrieved from https:\/\/eavi.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/beyond-fake-news_COLOUR_WEB.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Caesar, E. (2019). The chaotic triumph of\nArron Banks, the bad boy of Brexit. The\nNew Yorker<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.newyorker.com\/magazine\/2019\/03\/25\/the-chaotic-triumph-of-arron-banks-the-bad-boy-of-brexit<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Collins, D. (2019). Disinformation and\n\u2018fake news\u2019: Final Report published.  \nRetrieved from https:\/\/www.parliament.uk\/business\/committees\/committees-a-z\/commons-select\/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee\/news\/fake-news-report-published-17-19\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Dilnot, A. (2016). UK Statistics Authority\nstatement on use of official statistics on contributions to the European\nUnion.   Retrieved from https:\/\/www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk\/news\/uk-statistics-authority-statement-on-the-use-of-official-statistics-on-contributions-to-the-european-union\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Farage, N. (2016). [Nigel_Farage] (June 16, 2016) The EU has failed us all. [Tweet] Retreived from https:\/\/twitter.com\/nigel_farage\/status\/743383974119079937<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Field, M., & Wright, M. (2018, 17th\nOctober 2018). Russian Trolls sent thousands of pro-leave messages on day of\nBrexit referendum, Twitter data reveals.\nThe Telegraph<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/technology\/2018\/10\/17\/russian-iranian-twitter-trolls-sent-10-million-tweets-fake-news\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Freeland, J. (2019, 9th March 2019).\nAnti-vaxxers, the momo challenge … why lies spread faster than facts. The Guardian<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/books\/2019\/mar\/08\/anti-vaxxers-the-momo-challenge-why-lies-spread-faster-than-facts<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Gibbon, G. (2018). 45 per cent of Vote\nLeave Facebook ads were on immigration.  \nRetrieved from https:\/\/www.channel4.com\/news\/by\/gary-gibbon\/blogs\/45-per-cent-of-vote-leave-facebook-ads-were-on-immigration<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Gruzd, A., Wellman, B., & Takhteyev, Y.\n(2011). Imaging Twitter as an Imagined Community. American Behavioral Scientist<\/em>(55), 25. doi:10.1177\/0002764211409378<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Halliday, J., & Walker, P. (2019, 4th\nMarch 2019). Ukip 2.0: young, angry, digital and extreme. The Guardian<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2019\/mar\/03\/new-ukip-gerard-batten-corbyn-hard-right-momentum<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Huberman, B. A., Romero, D. M., & Wu,\nF. (2009). Social Networks that Matter: Twitter under the Microscope. First Monday, 14<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Jo Cox MP. (2016).   Retrieved from Wikipedia, Retrieved March 22 2019 from https:\/\/en.m.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Jo_Cox<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    McDuling, J., & Duke, J. (2019, 25th\nFebruary 2019). Facebook targeting of extremists, fringe movements in Australia\nstokes civil unrest fears. Sydney Morning\nHerald<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.smh.com.au\/business\/companies\/facebook-targeting-of-extremists-fringe-movements-in-australia-stokes-civil-unrest-fears-20190220-p50yyn.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    McGonagle, T. (2017). \u201cFake news\u201d: False\nfears or real concerns? Netherlands\nQuarterly of Human Rights, 35(4)<\/em>, 203-209. doi:10.1177\/0924051917738685<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Molz, J. G. (2013). The Social Affordances\nof Flashpacking: Exploring the mobilty nexus of travel and communication. Retrieved\nfrom  doi:10.1080\/17450101.2013.848605<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Penncheva, D. (2019). Brexit and migration:\nour new research highlights fact-free news coverage.   Retrieved from https:\/\/vip.politicsmeanspolitics.com\/2019\/03\/07\/brexit-and-migration-our-new-research-highlights-fact-free-news-coverage\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Sattler, J. (2019). Pro-leave Brexit\nTwitter activity boosted by suspicious activity, foreign support.  Retrieved from https:\/\/blog.f-secure.com\/pro-leave-brexit-twitter-activity-boosted-suspicious-activity-foreign-support\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Volz, D. (2018). Russians Took Aim at Black\nVoters to Boost Trump, Reports to Senate Find. Wall Street Journal<\/em>. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/russians-took-aim-at-black-voters-to-boost-trump-reports-to-senate-find-11545066563<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"Creative<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n


    Impacts of disinformation and \u2018fake news\u2019 related to the immigration debate, disseminated through social media platforms by the leave side in the 2016 European Union referendum in the United Kingdom. by     David Newberry<\/a> is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License<\/a>.
    Based on a work at     https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The intentional and widespread distribution of disinformation on social media networks is undermining democratic processes. Jurisdictions around the world are playing catch-up with this emerging and evolving form of targeted mass communication. The 2016 United Kingdom (UK) Referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) was no exception. The outcome of the advisory referendum was… Continue reading Impacts of disinformation and \u2018fake news\u2019 related to the immigration debate, disseminated through social media platforms by the leave side in the 2016 European Union referendum in the United Kingdom.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":399,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[89,36,42,43,41,40,38,39,37,35],"class_list":["post-69","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-communities","tag-bots","tag-brexit","tag-clickbait","tag-european-union","tag-fake-news","tag-immigration","tag-leave-eu","tag-referendum","tag-trolls","tag-united-kingdom"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":532,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69\/revisions\/532"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/399"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Open\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}