{"id":538,"date":"2019-05-07T22:54:38","date_gmt":"2019-05-07T14:54:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/?p=538"},"modified":"2019-05-07T23:55:21","modified_gmt":"2019-05-07T15:55:21","slug":"youngsters-in-china-dont-know-the-internet-like-the-rest-of-the-globe-and-they-prefer-it-that-way","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/2019\/05\/07\/youngsters-in-china-dont-know-the-internet-like-the-rest-of-the-globe-and-they-prefer-it-that-way\/","title":{"rendered":"Youngsters in China don’t know the Internet like the rest of the globe and they prefer it that way"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The internet has made a huge\nimpact on the web 2.0 giving people the opportunity to communicate. The newest\nDigital report of 2018(Kemp, 2018) reveals that there are 4.021 billion of\nInternet Consumers and among them, 3.196 billion users actively use social\nnetworks. Social sites are promising tools in every field: from social to\neconomic. The most well-known globally are notably Facebook, WhatsApp and\nTwitter. On the other hand, Weibo and WeChat are famous social networks which\ncontains millions of Chinese users(Wang & Tang, 2015). The dynamics of\nusage in China are different the Western part and the current Chinese internet\ngeneration is distinctively contrasting(Monggilo, 2016). Sadly, Chinese\nyoungsters do not know the internet like the rest of the globe and they prefer\nit that way. China with the largest internet users in Asia and the world has\nbeen accredited as the country with the lowest Internet freedom(CCNIC, 2015).\nGoogle, Facebook and foreign websites are blocked. Technical censoring mechanisms\ninclude IP blocking, content censoring, and keyword \ufb01ltering to restrict a\nuser\u2019s capability to access information and freely communicating(Qiao &\nShih, 2018). An abundance of cloned applications with similar functions were\ncreated however the contents are highly filtered. This paper explores Chinese\nyoungsters evolving differently in the age of digitization from the rest of the\nworld and the goal is to determine the reasons why they prefer their current\nsituation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Technology has given mankind\nan asset known as the Internet. The total of Chinese Internet users during the\nhalf of 2018 was noted to be 802 million(Kemp, 2018). The 42nd<\/sup>\nbi-annual statistic report from the China Internet Network Information\nCenter(CNNIC) reveals that internet availability was raised to 57.7% with 26.3%\nof Internet consumers being from remote parts. According to a survey from the\nCNNIC, by July 2008, the number of Internet users in China has reached 253\nmillion, surpassing the U.S. as the world\u2019s largest Internet market. Although the\ndevelopment of the Internet industry in China is outstanding, the young Chinese\ngeneration in this digital era are getting familiar with the Internet\ndifferently from the rest of the world. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter,\nInstagram as well as famous websites include Bloomberg and Chinese Wikipedia supporting\nthe freedom of speech are banned(Monggilo, 2016). Even Google which allows\naccess to all democratic and controversial information happening worldwide is\nblocked(Schlaeger & Jiang, 2014). Many Asian countries implement censorship\nlegislation and similarly, China followed the path starting from filtering,\nregulating internet content and applying multilevel control mechanisms. If any\nweb page is found to be dangerous bypassing the rules and safety of China, it\ngets blocked by the Government without proper explanation and this act has been\nlabeled as the \u201cGreat Chinese Firewall\u201d(Zhi-Jin & Huang, 2017). US based\nNGO which promotes freedom speech labeled China as \u2018the worst abuser of internet\nfreedom\u2019 for the 3rd consecutive years in its Net Freedom report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Censorship in China has been\ndominant way long in its history. One example often depicted in dramas is the\nburning of scholar books by the First Chinese emperor. The trend targeted the\ninternet. Fallows stated that from 2000 to 2007, 80% of the Chinese population started\nhaving negative impressions of the internet(as cited in Monggilo, 2016) and\nthey agreed upon giving the control of the Internet to the Government to\nregulate internet censorship practice(Yang, 2013). Most content available today\nare unknown to Chinese people. Evaluating from the Government\u2019s perspective,\ninternet censorship is a good thing as it filters out pornography and vulgarity\nwhich is a taboo for China(Tu, 2016). Banning sites which bring negative\ninfluences makes the internet with a healthier platform especially for young\npeople who are easily manipulated and find it hard to different between good\nand bad. More on, for years, the Government parties have feared that infiltration\nof foreign pop culture and the western values on the internet will impact their\nyouth and this might make them lose their grip on the ideological loyal towards\ntheir culture(Kou & Nardi, 2017). Hence, the Government doesn\u2019t want the younger\npopulation to be corrupted by these Western ideologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meeting Chinese friends\nduring social events made me learn the existence of a Chinese social network\ncalled Sina Weibo which is one of China\u2019s biggest social networks.  It is\na Chinese social networking application which has similar features as\nTwitter(Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014). Created an account on it led to some\ninteresting facts. Weibo allows a person to be know who visited the latter\u2019s\nprofile and at what specific time. But the main unusual factor is the way\nindividuals express themselves. The users are more active in posting personal\ninformation on themselves instead of freely discuss topics linked to political\norganizations like on Twitter. Some implemented difference codes for expressing\nthemselves on sensitive matters(Qiao & Shin, 2018).  This shows that the population must obey to\nthe Chinese rules of not posting sensitive contents. The meme on referring the\nGovernment Xi with Winnie the Pooh was blocked. Furthermore, Weibo\u2019s existence\nhas created a lot of heated controversies due to the government control to\nerase information. One big scandal occurred in October 2010 when a drunk boy,\nLi Qiming, aged 22 was involved in a hit and run case while heading to Hebei\nUniversity. He warned lightly; \u201cSue me if you dare, my father is Li Gang! (a\ndeputy police chief in nearby district).\u201d This case became a sensation as the\ngovernment covered it(Poell, Kloet & Zeng, 2014). Any online or offline\npublic opinions which can cause chaos against the political party are erased\nwhile negative comments are blue-penciled(Mou & Atkin, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before Xi Jinping becoming\nthe current President, the internet was turning into a common political\nplatform for the population and people could possess transparency in some\ncontents and the power of communication(Zhi-Jin & Huang, 2017). Today,\nChina operates the most sophisticated online censorship system on the planet.\nFamous Chinese bloggers and social activists were voicing out their thoughts\nand the netizens in unity made virtual petitions and protest and make the\nofficials aware of their wrong actions(Clark & Zhang, 2017).  A survey in 2010 reveals that 300 Chinese\nauthorities were worried on online leaking about their wrongdoings or private\ndetails(You & Huberman, 2011). Among the 6000 Chinese people who did the\nsurvey, 88% of them reacted positively on officials having this fear. But in\n2012, for President Xi, the virtual world and reality should be treated equally\nin terms of ideologies and standards(Bao, 2013). Therefore, he started\ninvesting in technological models to reinforce the internet censorship with\nmore new strict laws and punishments. The population was informed that the\ninitiative behind this change is to protect them from cyber-attacks(Fourie\n& Bothma, 2014). SNSs were started to be monitored, political content\nbanned, the press fully controlled, and rebels were imprisoned(Mou & Atkin,\n2014). The Government officials believed that limiting people\u2019s knowledge will\nprotect their image(Bao, 2013). In my opinion, this is compromising the\nnetizens\u2019 rights to freedom of speech. Even if the censorship on politics are\nbeing mentioned to protect the public, no one is superior enough to decide the\nwelfare of a society by implanting his personal views as they are not forcibly\ncorrect. Also, the public\u2019s creativity is hindered as they cannot access\ndemocratic or sensitive topics which are important for growing knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately, most netizens agree with President Xi\u2019s views and they prefer it this way. The main reason is the fact that many Chinese citizens turn to their regulated internet to get deeper understanding about the events going on in China and focus more about communicating among themselves since their media is heavily censored(Wang & Mark, 2015). The internet is a main source of entertainment for them and youngsters like it because they get many social sites and services(Piskorski, 2014). Although they cannot access many western social and blogging sites, china has allowed the emergence of a plethora of similar Chinese networking sites although they are monitored(Schlaeger & Jiang, 2014). In US, the most popular SNS is Facebook however in China, there\u2019s a variety of options such as WeChat, Weibo, QQzone, Renren and so on(Yang, 2013). Some even provide social games to keep the users engage while others like yy.com allow singing with friends(Jinfang, 2015). When asked about Facebook, one of my friends named Joy (\u559c\u60a6), a freshman student at Changsha University responded,  \u201cIs it like our WeChat?\u201d referring to China\u2019s  popular messaging app. WeChat is an indispensable tool in their daily lives. Besides having similar features like texting, voice messages and video-calls, WeChat provides further functions such as booking taxis or appointments, sending payments, food orders and many more which are not available on Facebook(Svesson, 2013). Accustomed to their country\u2019s services and applications, the youth shows zero interest in understanding what\u2019s censored online allowing China to construct an alternative value system competing with the western liberal democracy(Mongillo, 2016). These apps make the youngsters appreciate their country\u2019s technologies as their entertainment and communication needs are satisfied(Piskorski, 2014). This factor makes them prefer the internet the way it is even with the internet censorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another explanation is the\ncase when the Chinese Government ordered the pre-installment of a censorship\nsoftware called \u201cGreen Dam Youth Escort(\u7eff\u575d\u82b1\u5b63\u62a4\u822a\/ Lvba Huaji Huhang)\u201d on every new PC being sold on the\nmarketing including those that are being imported(Kou & Nardi, 2017). The\naim of this initiative was to protect the youth from having their mind\ncorrupted due to pornography and violence graphics. As many netizens supported\nthis idea, the researchers Kou and Nardi from the article \u2018A Confucian Look at Internet Censorship in China\u2019 came up with a very interesting analysis on this\nissue. After closely gathering enough information, they found out that unlike\nmost countries that have the will to protest the decisions of their governments\nand view censorship as infringement of one\u2019s rights, the Chinese society have\nthe mindset of the Confucian state-society ideal regarded by the belief\n\u201ccustodian government(\u7236\u6bcd\u5b98\n\/fuwu guan)\u201d, which gives the netizens a misconception on\ninterpreting censorship. This Confucian belief reflect a state society\nstructure in which the government upholds the authority by setting an exemplary\nimage misguiding the population into believing that he cares for them. In\nreturn, the netizens respect and obey the projects of the Political Party. Both\nbenefit from the situation causing social ideology, harmony and peace to\nprevail in the country(Wang & Mark, 2015). Upon interviewing some undergraduate\nstudents from Nanjing University, they stated; \u201cThe censorship in China is\neffective because it fosters an environment in which citizens do not demand\nsuch information in the first place\u201d. However,\nthe Chinese culture does not summon hierarchy, nor it confronts the government\nlegacy if the regulations match the confusion beliefs(Kou & Nardi, 2017). Back to the \u201cGreen Dam\u201d,\nmany netizens consented because they expect a society with better morals which\nregulates the youngsters with the correct norms. Thus, for China, censorship is\nnot a violation of rights rather it perceives it as a beneficial regulation\nthat makes it meet the expected moral ethics(Fourie & Bothma, 2014). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The last justification is\nthat the Chinese President Xi has spent a lot of money to make the \u2018Great\nFirewall\u2019 and many youngsters affirm that the country\u2019s investment in the\ninternet censorship project is fruitful(Bieli\u0144ski, 2018). Recently, when social media giant Tencent surveyed more than 10,000\nusers who were born in 2000 or after, nearly eight in 10 said they thought\nChina was either in its best time in history or was becoming a better country\neach day (Tencent & China Internet Watch, 2019). Kaifu Lee, an innovation young incubator and the owner\nof Innovation Works living in Beijing, mentioned that censorship acts as a\nmechanism to protect the local IT businesses even though the main idea was not\nmeant to target this point(Bao, 2013). Censorship can eradicate some\ncompetitive foreign firms in the market which give more job opportunities and\nprofits to the local ones(Bieli\u0144ski, 2018). \u201cThe\nmost pressing concern for entrepreneurs is to survive; I feel grateful to the\ngovernment for the censorship rules as it prevents international firms from\ngetting in China\u2019s market\u201d he added. According to Statista 2019,\nFacebook gained approval to open a subsidiary in the eastern province of\nZhejiang \u2013 only to see the approval quickly withdrawn. Even if the western apps\nand sites make it into China, they may face apathy from young people. Lee\u2019s opinion is further discussed by his friend\nBishop Bill, Company Sinocism\u2019s editor. He argued by stating that in the\nfuture, people\u2019s views might change as being deprived from the latest\ninformation and idea exchanges on a more worldwide platform represents a big\nloss for new entrepreneurs and those who wish to expand beyond China(Bieli\u0144ski, 2018). The Chinese government recently banned\nGitHub, an open source site where global programmers would discuss projects and\nBishop was part of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To\nconclude, this paper reflects how china\u2019s youngsters are very opinionated about\ninternet censorship in the country and most of them have no interest in being\nto expose to the internet like the rest of the world because they like it this\nway. I aimed to find out the reasons behind Chinese youngsters not knowing about\ncensored contents on the internet and internet. Many factors such as regulating\nthe internet to stop pornography, violence and political sensitive information\nthat can disrupt the mind of the youngsters were explored. Then, I focused on\nwhy the youngsters prefer this situation and do not voice out to the government\non the censored regulations. The Chinese apps copying the western ones offering\nbetter features, an analysis of the society\u2019s Confucian belief prevailing and\ninternet censorship providing better prospects in the job sector were\ninspected. Although social networks connect the world together diminishing\nbarriers, whether terming internet censorship as normal or as a big danger\ntowards freedom of exchanging information is arguable. As MacKinnon (2011)\nstated, \u201cIf people do not wake up and \ufb01ght for the protection of rights on the\nInternet, we should not be surprised to find out one day that they have been\nlegislated and sold away\u201d(as cited in Monggilo, 2016).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References: <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The internet has made a huge impact on the web 2.0 giving people the opportunity to communicate. The newest Digital report of 2018(Kemp, 2018) reveals that there are 4.021 billion of Internet Consumers and among them, 3.196 billion users actively use social networks. Social sites are promising tools in every field: from social to economic.… Continue reading Youngsters in China don’t know the Internet like the rest of the globe and they prefer it that way<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":61,"featured_media":544,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[186,189,25,106,65,21,52,42,187,90,188],"class_list":["post-538","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-communities","tag-china","tag-chinese","tag-communities","tag-internet","tag-online-communities","tag-social-media","tag-social-networking-sites","tag-social-networks","tag-tencent","tag-web2-0","tag-wechat"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/61"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=538"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":549,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538\/revisions\/549"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/544"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=538"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=538"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=538"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}