{"id":160,"date":"2019-05-05T18:16:26","date_gmt":"2019-05-05T10:16:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/?p=160"},"modified":"2019-05-05T18:16:26","modified_gmt":"2019-05-05T10:16:26","slug":"social-media-and-brexit-the-role-of-social-media-in-the-outcome-of-the-uks-eu-referendum","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/networkconference.netstudies.org\/2019Curtin\/2019\/05\/05\/social-media-and-brexit-the-role-of-social-media-in-the-outcome-of-the-uks-eu-referendum\/","title":{"rendered":"Social Media and Brexit: The Role of Social Media in the Outcome of the UK’s EU Referendum"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
Yan_18842588_A1_FINAL<\/a>Download<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the 23rd<\/sup> of June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU with Leave gaining 51.9% of the votes against 48.1% for Remain (Gr\u010dar et al., 2017). This result would spell the end of UK\u2019s 41-year association with the EU & David Cameron\u2019s reign as British Prime Minister. Theresa May would take over as Prime Minister (Abboushi, 2018). This research article will explore the use of social media sites from the Leave and Remain campaigns relation to the debate over whether the United Kingdom should remain or leave the European Union (EU). This paper will analyse the extent to which the respective groups used social media to inform, engage and influence Britons into voting for their side. There will be a look into the types of information, overall engagement and strategies used. The paper will argue how the Leave campaign\u2019s use social media impacted the outcome of the United Kingdom\u2019s European Union referendum in 2016 through their ability to incorporate more potential users to vote in favour of leaving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social\nmedia has also become a popular forum for political debate, information\ngathering, posting & campaigning. For example, 22% of Americans engaged in\nTwitter for the purpose of following the 2010 mid-term elections. Users can\norganise groups tailored towards certain views & follow political\ncandidates & parties (Gr\u010dar et al., 2017).\nThe Brexit debate was another political issue heavily discussed on platforms\nlike Twitter & Facebook throughout the campaign period (Gr\u010dar et al., 2017; Mancosu and Bobba, 2019).\nThis paper will analyse how the result of Britain\u2019s European Union referendum\nwas impacted through the Leave campaign\u2019s ability to engage a wider of range of\nBritish social media users their own use of social media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nfirst idea relates will relate to the Leave campaign\u2019s use of misinformation on\nsocial media. Cadwalladr (2019) will discuss how\nill-informed truths about immigration from pro-Leave Facebook pages affected\nthe polling results of a regional Welsh town with among the lowest immigration\nrates. The term of post-truth politics will be discussed in line with the Leave\ncampaign on social media through certain facts they would be found to have\nfabricated (Marshall and Drieschova, 2018). Evolvi (2018) will provide a\nspecific example of Islamophobia to display how misleading information was used\nto drive this element of the overall movement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nnext section will discuss how Leave supporters were quantitively far more\nengaging on Twitter and Instagram. Gr\u010dar et al.\n(2017) will delve into notable Leave and Remain handles to analyse the number\nof Tweets posted on these accounts, in addition to the number of retweets they\ngained. Llewellyn & Cram (2016) will highlight how the Leave campaign were\nable to gain an early headstart on their Remain rivals on Twitter through their\nengagement. Polonski (2016) will analyse user enagement into this issue between\nthe respective campaigns on Instagram and find similar results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall social media tactics from the Leave and Remain\ncampaigns will be compared to determine which one was more effective.\nEmotionally-driven, diverse strategies from the Leave campaign will be aruged\nto have helped strech out their target audience and potential voters (Mullen,\n2016; Polonski, 2016; Usherwood and Wright, 2016). Logical and non-extensive\npolicies from the Remain campaign will be aruged to be relatively ineffective\nto Leave\u2019s strategy (Polonski, 2016). These factors put together will determine\nhow the Leave campaign\u2019s use of social media helped achieve the result they desired\nfor. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Discussion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Misinformation from Leave<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Misinformation from the Leave campaign was spread through\nsocial media allowing Britons from all over the country. Cadwalladr (2019)\noutlines how misinformation from pro-Leave pages attracted users from a\nregional Welsh town called Ebbw Vale to vote in favour of leaving the EU. In\nher Ted talk, she noted how locals had issues with immigration despite the town\nhaving an immigration rate that was among the lowest. A local women also told\nher about how she find misinformation on Facebook regarding Turkey\u2019s plans to\njon the EU. However, still to this day Turkey is not an EU member or even\nrequesting to join. This is an example of how the Leave campaign was able to\nspread their lies to even the most remote of British towns through social\nnetwork sites like Facebook (Cadawalladr, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marshall & Drieschova (2018) look into the concept of\npost-truth politics and political distrust with the affordances of social media\naccelerating these notions. The authors depicted three pieces of misinformation\nvital to the Leave campaign which regarded how many pounds the UK sent to the\nEU, their migration levels and Turkey\u2019s apparent intentions to join the EU, of\nwhich was seen as threat of local jobs. With Turkey\u2019s EU links being disproven\nin the Ted talk from Cadwalladr (2019), they found the UK sent around \u00a3248\nmillion to the EU per week rather than the \u00a3350 million stated by Leave pages (Marshall and Drieschova, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another way some Leave supporters used misinformation on\nsocial media in regards to Islam. Islamophobia refers to an unjustified\nantagonism of Muslims (Evolvi, 2018). Evolvi (2018) suggests some sections of\nthe Leave campaign including UKIP leader Farage, was based around a so-called\n\u201cMuslim invasion\u201d affecting so-called British identity & values (Evolvi,\n2018, p4.). Farage displayed a poster showing a procession of brown-skinned\nmales to help run his campaign. This Islamophobic sentiment was further fuelled\non Twitter by hashtags like \u201c#IslamIsTheProblem,\u201d & searches like \u201cMuslim\nterrorists\u201d (Evolvi, 2018, p5). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some users went as far to suggest Islam was the enemy to\nWestern society. A tweet from the 24th<\/sup> of June proposed that the\noutcome was \u201ca vote against Islamic immigration to the UK\u201d (Evolvi, 2018, p8),\n& even questioned whether \u201cthe west will go to with Islam\u201d (Evolvi, 2018,\np8). Evolvi (2018) believes Twitter allows for this prejudice against Muslims\nto spread as users could spread these opinions across the platform without\ninterference. These ill-informed sentiments were validated & passed on\nduring & after the Brexit referendum allowing users to vote Leave based on\nthese views (Evolvi, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Misinformation\nand fake news on Facebook and Twitter were spread false facts on issues like\nimmigration, Islam and foreign policy. Their sharing of anti-immigration and\/or\nIslam sentiments was so effective, it was able to reach regional areas of\nBritain with among low percentages of immigrants like Ebbw Vale (Cadawalladr, 2019; Marshall and Drieschova, 2018; Evolvi, 2018). Due to this\ninclusion, Britons had a source of information to make up their mind for the\nsubsequent referendum when they may have not voted (Polonski, 2016). The next\nsection will regard how the Leave campaign were far more proactive on social\nmedia than Remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Engagement\nLevels <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gr\u010dar et al. (2017) found the Leave camp was far more\nengaging than Remain. None of the top ten most impacts users were Remain\naccounts with @vote_leave, @Vote_LeaveMedia & at least three other\ndistinguishable Leave accounts being identified. The authors note the relative\nhyperactivity of the @vote_leave account relative to the @StrongerInPress, an\nofficial Remain handle. The pro-Leave account posted 1567 tweets & gaining\n256 463 retweets while the Remain at only posted 580 tweets & gaining 1840\nretweets (Gr\u010dar et al, 2017). This is a massive disprecancy between the respective\naccounts with the Leave handle tweeting almost three times more and gaining 139\ntimes more retweets, hence attracting far more users and reach compared to the\nRemain account. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Llewellyn & Cram (2016) backed up the higher population\nof Leave tweets throughout the campaign. Leave supporters were also more\nproactive early on Twitter with clear united motivation to leave despite its\ninternal divides. The Remain campaign only picked up momentum as referendum day\ndrew closer with a relative lack of unity and movitation. The gradual increase\nin Remain tweets might have been caused by the possibility of a potential\nBrexit, leading to more proactiveness from this side (Llewellyn and Cram,\n2016). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite being a more youth-orientated social media device\n(Anderson, 2016), Instagram also saw a far greater proportion of Leave\nsentiment. Polonski (2016) found there were two times more pro-Leave users than\nRemain accounts, with five times greater engagement for their cause than\nRemain. There were 26% more likes on Leave posts with 20% more comments being\nleft (Polonski, 2016, p.94). Instagram become a political playground\nparticularly for pro-Leave users despite not being a dominant category for post\nsharing (Hu, Manikonda and\nKambhampti, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A greater amount of tweets were tended towards users wanting\nleave the European Union (Gr\u010dar et al, 2017; Llewellyn and Cram 2016). Polonski\n(2016) noted a substanially greater engagement from the Leave campaign on\nInstagram outlining their reach and online supremacy across the three out of\nBritain\u2019s top four most popular social networking sites (The most popular social networks in the UK | Technology | YouGov\nRatings,<\/em> 2018). In addtion to being more active, Leave pages also had\nbetter strategies on social media throughout the debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social\nMedia Strategies <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In additon to being far more active on social media, Leave\npages and profiles had a more effective campaigning strategy. Leave groups\nengaged in variety of political issues like immigration, British identity,\neconomy and national security  (Mancosu\nand Bobba, 2019; Usherwood and Wright, 2016). Due to the diverse range of\ntopics, they might have been able to reach a wider audience of the British\npopulation, including the older demographics. In a study by Mancosu & Bobba\n(2019) also found pro-Brexit voters on Facebook were older in age on average,\ncorrelating to the UK\u2019s ageing population (Wilkoszewski, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mullen (2016) aruges that Leave groups were substantially\nmore prolific at targeting various social media users than Remain. This is\nbacked up by Polanski (2016), who states how the Leave group were more friutful\nin their social media messaging. Leave\u2019s strategies were direct, simple and\nemotionally driven, with the latter driving the vast reach across social media.\nThese mechanisms facilitated greater reach as users would have felt a great\nsense of devotion to a cause (Polonski, 2016). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Remain used logical arguments, rather than emotional, with\nlittle social media presence other than when #CatsAgainstBrexit began trending\nalbeit in vain (Polonski, 2016). Their main policies regarded the specific\neconomic issues in trade and business with domestic agendas entering the fray\nin the month of the referendum (Usherwood and Wright, 2016). The relative lack\nof policies might have meant the Remain campaigners were not able to reach\nenough social media users, hence allowing Leave pages to open the referendum\ndebate to range of issues unopposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Leave campaign\u2019s more potent and passionate social media\nstrategy might have been pivotal in influcing the outcome considering the\ncloseness of the final outcome. They might have swayed non-voters towards\nvoting for Leave due to their social media mechanisms. Remain\u2019s social media\nstrategy was more rational which in turn, would have not as profound effect as\nthe emotional-based Leave tactics (Polonski, 2016). Overall, the Leave movement\nwas able to target more potential undecided voters on social media, potentially\ninfluencing what was a close referendum. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nLeave campaign\u2019s use of social media to influence people was crucial in the\neventual decision. They were able to spread their messages on Facebook, albeit\nat times misleading, to more isolated and regional parts of the UK (Cadwalladr,\n2019). The use of post-truth politics on social media was effective in running\ntheir efforts as users to engage people into believing their false facts. Their\nmisleading truths on Immigration, Islam meant their followers had information\nthey could use to justify their vote (Marshall\nand Drieschova,\n2018; Cadwalladr, 2019). False anti-Islam sentiment was a notable example in\nhow Leave voters used misinformation to promote a certain agenda which united\nelements of the overall Leave campaign (Evolvi, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leave\nsupporters were prominent across Twitter with significantly greater quantities of Tweets showing sentiments to leave the\nEuropean Union (Gr\u010dar et al, 2017; Llewellyn and Cram, 2016). They were also\nmuch more proactive in the earlier stages of the debate with Remain supporters\nonly clawing back of the some of ground as the referendum day closed (Llewellyn\nand Cram, 2016). Polonski (2016) noted how the Leave campaign\u2019s dominance was\ntranslated to a traditionally non-policital platform in Instagram to disperse\ntheir opinions more on the app. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pro-Leave groups on social media also had a more effective\nsocial media campaign as they were able to target a wider range of online\nBritons (Mullen, 2016). Usherwood & Wright (2016) refer to how they were\nable to incorporate a vast range of issues targeting Britain\u2019s main demographic\nstructure and making them feel included in the debate (Mancosu and Bobba, 2019;\nWilkoszewski, 2018), while the Remain campaign was based very few isses\n(Usherwood and Wright, 2016). Polonski (2016) outlined the element of emotion\nand how that enabled pro-Leave messages to spread across social media relative\nto the more rational arguments from the Remain side. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Leave campaign was able to sway the EU referendum vote\nthrough its extensive distribution of biased agendas, hyperactive posting\nacross Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, as well as having a plain-spoken and\npassionate social media campaign. These factors allowed their messages to\nspread online and offline across the UK to influence citizens to vote to Leave\nthe European Union. With the outcome being as close it was, it is fair to say\nsocial media had theirs in determining the outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Limitations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\npaper only analyses data from a small section of overall eligible voters in the\nUK. The potential of Bot impact also has not been outlined, of which could have\nalso affected the result (Marshall and Drieschova, 2018). The paper also does not cover\nany recent Brexit events such as the sort of deal the UK is willing to leave (Abboushi, 2018). These events are worth\nresearching into due to new points of discussion caused from the result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Bibliography<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Abboushi, S. (2018). Britain After Brexit – brief overview. Journal\nof International Trade Law and Policy, 17<\/em>(1\/2), 69-84.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anderson, K. E. (2016). Getting acquainted with social and apps:\nInstagram’s instant appeal. Library Hi Tech News, 33<\/em>(1), 11-15.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1108\/LHTN-03-2016-0011 <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

B\u00e2rg\u0103oanu,\nA., & Radu, L. (2018). Fake news or disinformation 2.0? some insights into\nromanians’ digital behaviour. Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 18<\/em>(1),\n24-38. Retrieved from https:\/\/search-proquest-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au\/docview\/2056443908?accountid=10382<\/a>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cadwalladr, C. (TED Guest Speaker). (2019, April 16). Facebook\u2019s\nrole in Brexit \u2013 and the threat to democracy [Streaming Video]. Retrieved from:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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