Facebook is known for its “privacy trainwrecks” (boyd, 2008) and has been criticised for its handling of these issues, often retreating until its users adjust to the changes brought upon them (Grimmelmann, 2009). However, there is more to look at when assessing privacy concerns around Facebook; to purely blame Facebook would be an exercise in technological determinism, instead there are societal and cultural values, political persuasions and economic motivations that shape the technology (Williams & Edge, 1996). As Clay Shirky has said, “[t]he human condition infects everything it touches” (1995, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1206). It is the users who perpetrate the crimes of privacy on Facebook. This paper argues that users are not innocent bystanders, but rather active participants in privacy violations against one another. From the moment users begin to create their identity-image, through to when they rapidly multiply their audience by accepting acquaintances as Friends; they are setting themselves up for context collisions, which they will experience as privacy violations (Grimmelmann, 2009). “The privacy violations are bottom-up; they emerge spontaneously from the natural interactions of users with different tastes, goals, and expectations” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1188). Users and their Friends – motivated so strongly by their social tendencies – are their own greatest privacy foe.
Daniel Solove (2007) defines privacy as being a personal bubble that allows freedom and protects individuals from the “intrusiveness of others”; and that a “society without privacy protection would be suffocation, and it might not be a place in which most would want to live.” (p. 762). Social network sites (SNS) such as Facebook are “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.” (boyd & Ellison, 2007). SNSs by definition are constructed for users to share information. It is in the interest of its users to share as much information as possible – this is what offers them a rich user-experience. However, by disclosing private information into these public arenas, people risk bursting their personal bubble and violating their privacy.
Yet, if this is the case then why do people still insist on divulging so much personal information? The answer is multi-layered, and James Grimmelmann (2009) sums it best:
(…) people have social reasons to participate on social network sites, and these social motivations explain both why users value Facebook notwithstanding its well-known privacy risks and why they systematically underestimate those risks. Facebook provides users with a forum in which they can craft social identities, forge reciprocal relationships, and accumulate social capital. These are important, even primal, human desires, whose immediacy can trigger systematic biases in the mechanisms that people use to evaluate privacy risks […] Facebook scratches its users’ social itches. Each drives users to release personal information; each depends on the personal information of other users. (p. 1151)
The strong motivating forces that drive users to participate in SNSs are the social factors of identity, relationship, and community. These social urges “can’t be satisfied under conditions of complete secrecy” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1159). Users’ identity and taste performances need an audience; relationships need friends and family; and community is not a private realm but rather depends on a public setting (Grimmelmann, 2009). Each of these social desires act as motivating forces to encourage Facebook users to disclose personal information.
Identity begins when Facebook users create their online profile. Creating their profile is in essence “typ[ing] oneself into being” (Sundén, as cited in boyd & Ellison, 2007). Facebook is the perfect forum for users to assert their identity and is done to persuade others of who they say they are (Grimmelmann, 2009). Crafting their profile is an exercise in “impression management” (Goffman, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1152) as well as “taste performance” (Liu, 2007). The act of listing their tastes – from music to movies – although it may seem prosaic is in fact a performance of “prestige, differentiation, authenticity and theatrical persona” (Liu, 2007). Liu continues, “taste statements need to be crafted so as to stand up to the scrutiny of an audience that is able to ‘glean unofficially by close observation’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 144)” (as cited in Liu, 2007).
Relationships are another motivating factor that come into play through the act of sharing information. When users share information with friends and family, they are publicly displaying their intimacy (Grimmelmann, 2009). Friending someone is a signal to all of your relationship (Grimmelmann, 2009). Facebook sets up the dynamic of reciprocity that is vital in human relationships: applications such as Gifts or even a Wall post elicits a need for them to show they care by reciprocating the gesture (Grimmelmann, 2009).
The final motivating social force is community. By users making their connections visible they are displaying their social context and, thus, where they fit within it (Grimmelmann, 2009), and providing revelations as to who they are (boyd, 2006). Their Friend-list is a visual cue of their social capital (Grimmelmann, 2009), and the cooler their Friends are, the cooler they look (boyd, 2006).
As each of these factors – identity, relationships, and community – has shown, these are deep-seated social urges that go to the very core of human desires and needs, and can be easily sated by partaking fully in the whole SNS experience. The price to pay for this is to risk their privacy, yet this seems a small price many users are willing to pay (Grimmelmann, 2009).
When evaluating the privacy risks of Facebook, users rely on cultural cues instead of the facts (Kahan et al, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009). Facebook sets up social dynamics that make users feel secure, after all, the SNS is a place for socializing, as such they are designed to feel intimate and reassuring (Grimmelmann, 2009); but it is also the users who over-simplify the situation when evaluating the risks (Grimmelmann, 2009). Users incorrectly rely on social adages. For example, users may justify to themselves that “if everyone else is doing it, then I’ll do it too… over 400 million users can’t be wrong!” or users may feel they have safety in numbers: “surely I can’t be singled out in this crowd?” (Grimmelmann, 2009).
Another way users may not appropriately evaluate the risks is because they are not adept at interacting in an online environment. In face-to-face interactions people give physical signals; for example, leaning in close suggests one is revealing a secret. However, in online interactions one loses these nuances and as such the conversation is not understood as being confidential in nature (Grimmelmann, 2009). This results in a user unintentionally divulging their friend’s sensitive information.
Just as each of these risk evaluations have been a product of social factors, so too are the privacy harms, categorized by Grimmelmann (2009) as disclosure, surveillance, instability, disagreement, spillovers, and denigration. These social dynamics cause privacy violations, and each is brought about by peer-to-peer interactions: “[u]sers’ privacy is harmed when other users learn sensitive personal information about them. Facebook enters the picture as a catalyst; it enables privacy violations more often than it perpetrates them” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1164). The privacy harms that support the argument will be explored in further detail.
Disclosure can be defined as when a user inadvertently gives away information to the unintended audience. An example of this is the story of Marc Chiles, a University of Illinois student, who in 2006 after a night out partying was seen urinating in public by a police officer. Before the police officer could get to him to take his name, Marc managed to escape; however, the officer questioned another student at the scene – Adam Gartner. Adam said he did not know the offender. Later the police officer checked Facebook and saw that Adam was indeed a friend of Marc, resulting in a ticket for them both (Grimmelmann, 2009). Adam and Marc were victims of disclosure: something they were happy to share in the context of Facebook was not something they wanted law enforcement to know. SNSs are rife with unwanted disclosures; these disclosures threaten a user’s identity and community (Grimmelmann, 2009).
Surveillance can be defined as when one is anxious of being watched and as a result inhibits or self-censors themselves (Solove, as cited by Grimmelmann, 2009). Facebook users are aware they can be watched online, from teachers and parents through to lawyers and the police force (Grimmelmann, 2009). Furthermore, any information that is posted to Facebook on a public profile is considered electronic evidence, meaning that as long as it can be verified as to what it says and who said it, then it is admissible in court (Jaksic, 2007). Users fashion their profile to be read by close friends in a social context; if you remove this context, users feel this is the unintended audience and therefore an invasion of privacy. The act of self-censoring alters one’s identity performance thus compromising one’s identity-image and relationships (Grimmelmann, 2009).
Another example of surveillance was seen with the rollout of News Feed. According to Nissenbaum, privacy is contextual integrity (as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009). The architecture of a site creates a social context that has a clearly defined “norms of flow” (Nissenbaum, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1169); News Feed disrupted the flow of information. The information had always been accessible, previously users could have snooped to find the information, but now instead it was broadcast to their Friend-list (boyd, 2008). This shifted the focus towards a surveillance psychology – all their actions were now exposed and monitored by their Friends, leaving users feeling “icky” (boyd, 2008, p. 14). This change is socially different to its previous structure and it carries different privacy values, thereby disrupting relationships (Grimmelmann, 2009), and is experienced as a violation of privacy.
Disagreement causes a privacy threat when two people have different ideas, with the misunderstanding costing one of them their privacy. For example, if a user has a compromising photo of their friend boozing on the weekend, although this friend may not want it shown, the user has control – they can upload it and tag it without the consent of their friend (Grimmelmann, 2009). By uploading it the user has an identity assertion to gain, “look my friends are cool, thus so am I”. However, for the friend in the photo left feeling betrayed by its disclosure to a wide audience, has had their privacy invaded.
Privacy leaks on SNSs are often due to the actions of others, this is known as spillovers, such as the previous example of a user uploading an embarrassing photo of a friend. A SNS by definition is designed to extend one’s social network. The result of this is that a user’s Friend-list ends up including acquaintances, each of which are less likely to know that user’s privacy expectations, thereby increasing their risk of a privacy leak (Grimmelmann, 2009). After all, a “’friend of a friend of a friend’ is pronounced ‘stranger’” (Shirky, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1174).
What helps increase the risk of spillovers is the dynamic of a SNS – as the network grows, where people are naturally inclined to add more and more people to their Friend-list, it’s also hard to ignore or reject friend requests; it’s easier to just accept them as a Friend (Grimmelmann, 2009). This leads to an increased number of weak ties on your Friend-list. As sociologists have illustrated, weak ties are important to growing one’s opportunities in their network, however with these weak ties come security risks, as one is then relying on these weak ties to be discreet with one’s privacy (Grimmelmann, 2009).
The “Dunbar number” suggests that the human brain can only know a limited number of people closely (Thompson, 2008), yet users’ Friend-lists can far exceed this number. Thus, users are lulled into thinking they are speaking to an audience of close friends who know them well; however “[e]veryone else isn’t a close friend, and the socially thick sense of mutual personal obligation that keeps confidences confidential doesn’t always operate as strongly as we expect” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1163).
What each of these harms demonstrates is that Facebook is a catalyst for “social convergence” (boyd, 2008). Users tailor and self-censor themselves depending on the social context they find themselves in: the way they present to their boss is different to that of their best friend. It is not appropriate to mix these self-presentations to these separate audiences. However on Facebook, users have to present themselves to multiple audiences all at once, which is not easy to do (Grimmelmann, 2009).
The paradox of Facebook is that the same mechanisms that help it create new social contexts also help it juxtapose them. It offers social differentiation but delivers convergence—which its users experience as a violation of privacy. (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1177-1178)
It is these spillovers from our carefully crafted identity-images as well as the fallout from context collisions that users interpret as privacy violations.
Another area where users should be more proactive with their privacy is by reading the privacy policy. Few people read the fine print as was recently demonstrated by gaming retailer GameStation: as an April Fool’s Day prank the company inserted an “immortal soul clause” into their terms of sale, with the result that 7,500 people agreed to sell their souls, thereby suggesting that “as many as 88 percent of people do not read the terms and conditions of a Web site” (“7,500 Online”, 2010).
Grimmelmann (2009) says of Facebook’s privacy policy that users “don’t read it, don’t understand it, don’t rely on it and certainly aren’t protected by it” (p. 1181). He goes on to discuss polls on people’s understanding of privacy policies: in 2001 only three percent of those polled said they “read privacy policies carefully ‘most of the time’” (p. 1182) and a survey of Facebook users in 2006 discovered that seventy-seven percent had never read the policy, and furthermore most users had “mistaken beliefs about how Facebook collected and shared personal information” (p. 1182). If users took more of an interest in the privacy policy of Facebook, they would be better prepared to handle its flaws, and perhaps even negotiate a more appropriate policy for all.
To think of Facebook as being solely responsible for privacy infringements is a simplistic view. Critics look at Facebook’s privacy leaks as being caused by weak privacy technical controls; however surveys have shown that users care little or do not know how to use Facebook’s privacy controls, with one study in 2008 finding half of SNS users leave these privacy controls on default (UK Office of Communications, as cited in Grimmelmann, 2009). More complex privacy settings are not the answer. After all, SNSs are designed to share information: “anything that makes it harder for [the user] to share is a bug, not a feature. Users will disable any feature that protects their privacy too much” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1187). This suggests that users have a role to play in protecting themselves from privacy risks.
Therefore, instead of purely blaming Facebook, we need to address the users’ role. “It’s their decisions to upload information about themselves that set the trouble in motion. The smaller we can make the gap between the privacy they expect and the privacy they get, the fewer bad calls they’ll make” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1195). Users driven by the strong social urges of identity, relationships, and community risk their privacy and the privacy of others (Grimmelmann, 2009). That is, through their desire to create an identity-image they divulge personal information; through their desire to socialize they accept strangers into their inner circle; and through their desire to build relationships they not only share their personal information but also that of their Friends – thus compromising their privacy, as well as that of their Friends. Users experience the resulting convergence and spillovers as violations to their privacy (Grimmelmann, 2009). By educating users of the consequences of their actions, we can empower them to better protect themselves for the privacy risks associated with sharing information in a public setting. But in the meantime, users need to bear in mind that on Facebook, Friends are foe.
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Friends Are Foe: The Risks of Social Networking by Angela Fitzhenry is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Australia License.

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